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REGULATORY MORATORIA 
KATHRYN A. WATTS† 
ABSTRACT 
  Despite significant scholarly attention given to tools that the 
political branches use to exert control over the administrative state, 
one emerging tool has gone largely unnoticed: regulatory moratoria. 
Regulatory moratoria, which stem from legislative or executive action, 
aim to freeze rulemaking activity for a period of time. As this Article 
demonstrates, regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the 
political toolbox at both the federal and state levels. For example, at 
least fifteen federal bills proposing generalized regulatory moratoria 
were introduced in the first session of the 112th Congress, and from 
2008 to 2011 alone, no fewer than nine states implemented some kind 
of executive-driven regulatory moratorium. In addition, beginning 
with President Reagan, all U.S. presidents other than George H.W. 
Bush have issued short-term regulatory moratoria immediately upon 
coming into office to facilitate review of midnight regulations passed 
by their predecessors. President Bush, who followed a member of his 
own party into the White House, instead implemented a one-year 
moratorium during his last year in office. 
  This Article aims to situate regulatory moratoria within the existing 
literature on political control of the administrative state. The goal of 
this Article is largely descriptive: to provide the first overarching 
description of the emergence of and proposals for regulatory 
moratoria at both the federal and state levels and the different contexts 
in which regulatory moratoria have arisen. The Article also seeks to 
identify and analyze the major arguments for and against regulatory 
moratoria from both a legal and a policy perspective. In weighing the 
pros and cons of regulatory moratoria, this Article warns against the 
use of “hard” moratoria—defined as long-term moratoria often 
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spanning a year or more. It also suggests, however, that “soft” 
moratoria—meaning short-term moratoria keyed to a brief period of 
political transition—might appropriately further notions of 
democratic accountability when used carefully by the executive 
branch following a change in administration to ensure that the 
regulatory machinery is aligned with the policies of those newly 
elected to power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have spent a great deal of time studying various 
mechanisms that the political branches use to exert control over the 
administrative state.1 One emerging tool for political control, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 
(2006) (examining congressional involvement in the administration of the laws); James F. 
Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy 
Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 851–52 (2001) (examining centralized presidential 
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however, has slipped by largely unnoticed: regulatory moratoria. 
Regulatory moratoria, which are also referred to as regulatory 
“suspensions” or “freezes,” stem from legislative or executive action, 
and they aim to halt or suspend rulemaking activity for a specified 
period of time.2  
This Article demonstrates that, far from being an isolated or 
novel concept, regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the 
political toolbox. Regulatory moratoria now provide a means through 
which executive and legislative actors at both the federal and state 
levels are either exerting or attempting to exert control over the 
administrative state.3 
At the federal level, short-term regulatory moratoria have 
become an entrenched feature of the period immediately after a 
president takes office. Beginning with President Reagan, upon 
coming into office, all presidents excluding George H.W. Bush have 
 
control of regulatory activities and arguing in favor of it); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (examining the “recent and 
dramatic transformation in the relationship between the President . . . and the administrative 
state”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (arguing that scholars have 
underestimated congressional involvement in oversight of administrative agencies). 
 2. Some regulatory moratoria are subject-specific—meaning that they apply only to 
regulations involving specific topics like greenhouse gases or healthcare. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 22, 
27th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2011) (resolving that “the Alaska State Legislature calls on the 
United States Congress to pass legislation prohibiting the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency from regulating greenhouse gas emissions”); S. 23, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2011) (proposing to impose a moratorium on rulemaking with respect to the 
implementation and enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code)); Exec. Order No. 2011-03 para. 1 (Idaho Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://gov.idaho.gov/
pdf/Executive%20Order%202011-03.pdf (directing that executive agencies within the state shall 
not promulgate “any rule to implement any provisions” of the ACA). Some moratoria also 
involve limits on appropriations in the form of targeted riders that prohibit specific regulatory 
activity. See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34354, 
CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON RULEMAKING AND REGULATION THROUGH 
APPROPRIATIONS (2008) (describing regulatory restrictions in appropriations bills). This Article 
focuses only on generalized regulatory moratoria rather than subject-specific moratoria.  
 3. Although this Article studies only regulatory moratoria in the United States, at least 
one other country—Mexico—has imposed a generalized one-year moratorium to boost its 
economy. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MEXICO: PROGRESS IN 
IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY REFORM 45 (2004) (noting that President Vicente Fox 
published a presidential decree in 2004 restricting new regulation until April 2005 and forcing 
federal agencies to conduct a review of existing regulations). In addition, in 2011, the United 
Kingdom announced a narrower moratorium on new domestic regulation for microbusinesses 
and start-ups. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, HM TREASURY, THE PLAN FOR 
GROWTH 56 (2011), available at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_growth.pdf.  
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issued orders to agency heads to freeze new rulemaking.4 In addition, 
in 1992, a federal moratorium was implemented outside the context 
of a change in administration when President George H.W. Bush 
ordered what turned into a one-year moratorium in the last year of 
his presidency.5 Furthermore, bills proposed in the 104th Congress—
one of which passed in the House—would have imposed a 
moratorium on federal rulemaking from November 1994 to 
December 1995.6 Later, in the first session of the 112th Congress 
alone, at least fifteen bills proposing some kind of a regulatory 
moratorium, such as the Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 
2011,7 were proposed.8 
Regulatory moratoria have emerged as a tool for political control 
at the state level as well. For example, in 1995, right around the time 
that Congress was considering imposing a federal regulatory 
moratorium via legislative action, New York’s Republican governor 
George Pataki ordered a ninety-day moratorium on new state 
regulations upon his coming into office,9 following up on a campaign 
promise to “be business friendly.”10 Subsequently, between 2008 and 
2011, in the wake of state budget crises and increased economic 
uncertainty, state-level regulatory moratoria were implemented in at 
least nine states11: Arizona, Florida, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.12 
Given the frequency with which regulatory moratoria are 
cropping up at both the federal and state levels, one might expect that 
scholars would have studied this emerging tool. Yet—with the 
exception of literature discussing moratoria imposed at the federal 
 
 4. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 5. See infra notes 41–66 and accompanying text.  
 6. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. §§ 3(a), 6(2) (1995); 
Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. § 103 (1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 
5880–81 (1995) (noting that 276 representatives voted in favor of the House bill).  
 7. Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 8. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 9. Exec. Order No. 2, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 5.2 (1995). 
 10. Tom Precious, Pataki Tightens Reins on Regulation, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 
6, 1995, at A1.  
 11. The phrase “at least” is used very purposefully because the number might be higher. 
Although the goal in conducting the research for this Article was to be as exhaustive as possible, 
some instances of moratoria or proposals for moratoria may have been missed. This possibility 
is heightened at the state level given the difficulty of conducting research involving all fifty 
states and the lack of easily searchable, comprehensive electronic databases for some state-level 
materials, such as executive orders. See infra notes 379–84 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
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level by presidents upon a change in political administration to enable 
review of so-called midnight regulations, which are regulations issued 
by an outgoing administration at the eleventh hour13—scholars 
generally have failed to study regulatory moratoria in any depth.14 
This lack of scholarly attention may be because the use of regulatory 
moratoria is still relatively nascent. Furthermore, because regulatory 
moratoria involve a significant element of political maneuvering, 
some legal scholars may have been quick to dismiss specific proposals 
for moratoria as individualized proposals that represent “more 
symbol than substance”15 and hence may have missed the bigger 
picture. In addition, administrative-law scholars often tend to 
approach issues through a federal lens, a tendency that likely has the 
effect of obscuring trends, such as regulatory moratoria, that become 
more apparent when viewed across federal and state lines.16  
Regardless of the reason for the dearth of scholarly attention, the 
lack of scrutiny needs to be remedied given the prevalence with which 
executive and legislative actors at both the federal and state levels are 
 
 13. For examples of scholarly discussion of presidential reliance on rulemaking 
suspensions, withdrawals, or freezes after a change in administration, see Jack M. Beermann, 
Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 983–84 (2003); Peter D. Holmes, 
Paradise Postponed: Suspensions of Agency Rules, 65 N.C. L. REV. 645, 646 (1987); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Jogging in Place: The Bush Administration’s Freshman Year Environmental Record, 
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,709, 10,715 (2002); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and 
Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 471–72, 473 n.8 (2011); William M. Jack, 
Comment, Taking Care That Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory Process Is Faithfully 
Executed: A Review of Rule Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions Under the Bush Administration’s 
Card Memorandum, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1479, 1483–84 (2002); B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight 
Regulations, Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 782, 782 (2003).  
 14. The only article that treats regulatory moratoria in any detail—outside of the context of 
moratoria imposed at the beginning of new presidential administrations—is a piece that focuses 
on the impact of a 1992 regulatory moratorium ordered by President George H.W. Bush during 
the last year of his presidency. See Scott R. Furlong, The 1992 Regulatory Moratorium: Did It 
Make a Difference?, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 254 (1995) (concluding that President Bush’s 
moratorium had little impact).  
 15. Jonathan H. Adler, Misguided Case for Regulatory Moratorium, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 26, 2011, 10:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/09/26/misguided-case-for-
regulatory-moratorium. 
 16. Cf. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and 
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L REV. 551, 553 (2001) (“[C]asebooks, treatises, and scholarship 
harbor a heavy bias towards federal administrative law, relegating state administrative 
procedure little, if any, serious attention.”); Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory 
Reform: A Comparative Analysis 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working 
Paper No. 98-3, 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=159578 (noting in a report studying 
state and federal regulatory reform that “identification of state regulatory reform provisions 
[had been] difficult because no comprehensive source of data exists”). 
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attempting to impose moratoria. This Article aims to supply the 
remedy by situating regulatory moratoria within the existing 
literature on political control of the administrative state and by 
providing the first comprehensive discussion of the emergence and 
use of regulatory moratoria. 
The main goal of this Article is descriptive: to trace the rise of 
regulatory moratoria and proposals for moratoria at both the federal 
and state levels and to describe the different contexts in which 
regulatory moratoria have arisen. Part I demonstrates that when one 
looks at both the federal and the state levels, moratoria are cropping 
up with increasing frequency and are becoming part of the political 
toolbox. As Part I shows, however, these moratoria do not all look 
alike. Whereas some moratoria have been driven by the executive 
branch, others have been driven by legislatures. In addition, some 
moratoria—referred to here as “hard” moratoria—are long-term 
moratoria spanning a year or more, whereas other moratoria—
referred to here as “soft” moratoria—are short-term moratoria that 
generally last only a few months and are keyed to a period of political 
transition. 
Part II seeks to identify and weigh the major arguments in favor 
of and against hard and soft regulatory moratoria from both a legal 
and a policy perspective, and in doing so, Part II offers some 
normative assessments regarding the proper use of regulatory 
moratoria moving forward. Ultimately, Part II warns against the use 
of hard moratoria because they threaten to create protracted 
regulatory confusion and evince an antiregulatory bias. In addition, as 
a 2011 decision handed down by the Florida Supreme Court 
demonstrates, executive-driven hard moratoria raise numerous legal 
questions and separation-of-powers concerns relating to whether the 
executive branch possesses the power to freeze agency rulemaking.17 
At the same time, however, Part II suggests that soft moratoria—if 
crafted to avoid major legal pitfalls—might play a more appropriate 
role, helping to further notions of democratic accountability when 
used for a brief period of time by the executive branch following a 
change in administration. Finally, Part III concludes by identifying 
some questions surrounding the use of moratoria that are in need of 
future study, including empirical questions about the actual impact of 
moratoria. 
 
 17. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11–592, 2011 WL 3568804, at *5 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per 
curiam) (finding an executive-ordered rulemaking suspension in Florida to be improper). 
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I.  THE EMERGENCE OF REGULATORY MORATORIA 
Since the rise of the modern administrative state and the broad 
delegation of policymaking powers to agencies,18 the political 
branches have used formal and informal tools for controlling the 
regulatory state and reining in agency discretion, including jawboning, 
the appointment process, centralized presidential oversight, 
congressional control of appropriations, and congressional hearings.19 
Scholars have spent much time studying these and other tools of 
political control, with a particular emphasis on presidential control of 
the administrative state.20 For example, prominent administrative-law 
scholars, including then-Professor Elena Kagan, have studied the 
origins of strong presidential oversight of federal agency rulemaking, 
tracing it back to President Reagan.21 According to then-Professor 
Kagan, President Reagan brought about a “sea change” in terms of 
increased presidential oversight of the regulatory state by “self-
consciously and openly adopt[ing] strategies to exert” his influence 
over the regulatory state.22 
Despite extensive scholarly attention given to political control of 
the administrative state, the extant literature has largely failed to 
identify regulatory moratoria as an emerging tool for political control. 
This Part describes the emergence of regulatory moratoria as a tool 
for control at both the federal and state levels, taking care to 
differentiate between moratoria issued by the legislative and 
executive branches and between two very different kinds of 
moratoria: what will be called “soft” and “hard” moratoria. Soft 
moratoria are defined here as short-term moratoria limited to brief 
 
 18. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2253 (“[A]s the administrative state grew and then the New 
Deal emerged, Congress routinely resorted to broad delegations . . . .”). 
 19. See supra note 1.  
 20. See Beermann, supra note 1, at 64–65 (noting that the phenomenon of presidential 
control of the administrative state “has received significant attention in legal academia,” 
especially in comparison to congressional control); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50 (1994) (arguing 
against the proposition that the Founders did not intend to have a strong unitary executive); 
Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) (arguing that in the context of the “ordinary world 
of domestic administration” the president’s role is to oversee, rather than decide, regulatory 
matters); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White 
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944 (1980) (analyzing judicially imposed restrictions on ex parte 
contacts in formal rulemaking and evaluating whether such restrictions should extend to 
informal rulemaking).  
 21. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2277–78.  
 22. Id. at 2277. 
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periods of political transition. By contrast, hard moratoria are defined 
here as long-term moratoria that span a year or more and that are not 
limited to brief periods of political transition.  
A. Moratoria at the Federal Level 
The concept of imposing a generalized regulatory moratorium 
seems to have originated with President Reagan. At the beginning of 
his presidency, Reagan imposed a temporary regulatory moratorium 
to enable review of the midnight regulations issued by the outgoing 
Carter administration.23 Since then, several different regulatory 
moratoria have been implemented at the federal level. So far, all of 
these federal rulemaking moratoria have stemmed from presidential 
rather than legislative command, and all but one have been soft 
moratoria coming at the beginning of new administrations.24 
Nonetheless, Congress has considered legislative proposals for hard 
moratoria on numerous occasions, and—even though none of these 
legislative proposals has become law—one such proposal did pass the 
House in 1995.25 All of this federal activity is described here, 
beginning with the history of soft and hard executive-driven 
moratoria at the federal level and then turning to various legislative 
calls for hard moratoria. 
1. Executive-Driven Moratoria.  Executive-driven moratoria at 
the federal level have arisen in two very different contexts to date: 
(1) numerous soft moratoria implemented at the beginning of new 
presidential administrations, as occurred when Presidents Reagan, 
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama entered the White House; and 
(2) one hard moratorium issued by President George H.W. Bush in 
the fourth year of his presidency in 1992.  
a. Presidentially Driven Soft Moratoria.  On January 29, 1981, 
President Reagan—immediately upon coming into office—issued a 
memorandum to designated heads of executive agencies titled 
“Memorandum Postponing Pending Federal Regulations.”26 In the 
 
 23. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 24. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 25. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 26. President Ronald Reagan, Memorandum Postponing Pending Federal Regulations, 
PUB. PAPERS 63 (Jan. 29, 1981). Before issuing the memo, President Reagan did obtain the 
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel as to the legality of the order. See Presidential 
Memorandum Delaying Proposed and Pending Regulations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 (1981) 
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memorandum, President Reagan directed agency heads—to the 
extent permitted by law and subject to certain specified exceptions—
to “postpone for 60 days” the “effective date of all regulations” that 
had been “promulgated in final form and that [were] scheduled to 
become effective during such 60-day period.”27 In addition, he 
directed agencies “[to] refrain, for 60 days following the date of this 
memorandum, from promulgating any final rule.”28 
President Reagan justified the order by stressing that one of his 
priorities was to “establish[] a new regulatory oversight process that 
[would] lead to less burdensome and more rational federal 
regulation,” and he explained that the postponement of pending 
regulations would enable him to review the “prior Administration’s 
last-minute decisions that would increase rather than relieve the 
current burden of restrictive regulation.”29 He also noted that this 
review of pending regulations was “especially necessary in the 
economic climate we have inherited.”30  
Subsequently, on February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued 
Executive Order 12,291,31 which created a formal regulatory review 
process using the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
which called for cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking.32 To 
permit reconsideration of pending rules in accordance with the terms 
of Executive Order 12,291, the order called for the postponement or 
suspension of “the effective dates of all major rules” that had been 
promulgated in final form as of the date of the order but that had not 
yet become effective.33 
Through the combination of Executive Order 12,291 and his 
prior January memorandum, President Reagan seems to have 
pioneered the idea of a soft, executive-driven regulatory moratorium 
keyed to a brief period of political change. Indeed, “[s]ince Reagan, 
every president taking over from a president of the opposing political 
party,” namely Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, has 
 
(concluding that the president has the “authority to direct executive agencies to postpone 
proposed and pending regulations for a 60-day period”).  
 27. Reagan, supra note 26, at 63. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).  
 32. Id. §§ 3(d), 6–7, 3 C.F.R. at 129, 131–33.  
 33. Id. § 7(a), 3 C.F.R. at 131–32.  
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“ordered a similar regulatory moratorium.”34 These short-term 
moratoria generally have been viewed and justified as tools for 
presidents to control the phenomenon of midnight rulemaking by the 
prior administration—a term that refers to the spike in new 
regulations that takes place at the end of a presidential term.35 
For example, President Clinton’s order noted that it was 
“important that President Clinton’s appointees have an opportunity 
to review and approve new regulations.”36 Likewise, President 
Obama’s memorandum noted that it was “important that President 
Obama’s appointees and designees have the opportunity to review 
and approve any new or pending regulations.”37 And President Bush’s 
memorandum explained that the president had requested the 
moratorium “[i]n order to ensure that the President’s appointees 
ha[d] the opportunity to review any new or pending regulations”—
although President Bush, unlike the others, also hinted at a 
deregulatory purpose by noting at the very end of the memorandum 
that independent agencies were welcome to voluntarily participate 
“in the interest of sound regulatory practice and the avoidance of 
costly, burdensome, or unnecessary regulation.”38 
Specifically, all of the moratoria issued by Presidents Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Obama involved a freeze on new rules until the 
new rules had been approved by an appointee of the new president, 
as well as the withdrawal of final rules that had been sent to the 
 
 34. Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations and Regulatory Review, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 189 (2009); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
32356, FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN OVERVIEW 22 (2004) (describing moratoria as “a 
technique that has been used to assert control over the rulemaking process, particularly for an 
incoming presidential Administration,” beginning with the Reagan administration).  
 35. On the existence, causes, and problems of midnight rulemaking, see generally CURTIS 
W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34747, MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND A NEW ADMINISTRATION (2008); Jack M. Beermann, 
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 352 (2009), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/9/LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf; Beermann, supra 
note 13; Brito & Rugy, supra note 34; Christopher Carlberg, Early to Bed for Federal 
Regulations: A New Attempt To Avoid “Midnight Regulations” and Its Effect on Political 
Accountability, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 992 (2009); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After 
Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing 
Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441 (2005); Sanford, supra note 13. 
 36. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section 1(d) 
of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993).  
 37. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).  
 38. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).  
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Federal Register but that had not yet been published.39 In addition, 
President Bush ordered—and President Obama suggested but did not 
mandate—the temporary postponement of the effective date of 
regulations that had been published in the Federal Register but that 
had not yet taken effect.40 Hence, since President Reagan, every 
president taking over the White House from an opposing political 
party has frozen the regulatory machinery when transitioning into 
office by using a short-term rulemaking freeze combined with the 
withdrawal of unpublished regulations or the postponement of the 
effective dates of final regulations. 
b. President Bush’s Hard Moratorium in 1992.  President George 
H.W. Bush seized on the concept of a regulatory moratorium in a 
very different and much broader context than had President Reagan. 
Specifically, when the economy was floundering in 1992, President 
Bush ordered what began as a ninety-day moratorium while he was 
running for reelection during what turned out to be the last year of 
his presidency.41 The moratorium, which was set forth in a 
memorandum titled “Reducing the Burden of Government 
Regulation,” requested that agency heads—to the maximum extent 
“permitted by law” and subject to certain exceptions—spend ninety 
days evaluating existing regulations and eliminating unnecessary and 
burdensome regulations rather than promulgating new regulations.42 
Unlike the soft moratorium that President Reagan had issued in 1981 
upon coming into office, which served primarily “to undo midnight 
regulations issued by the Carter administration, to wrest control of 
the bureaucracy, and to set the tone for the new administration’s view 
of the regulatory process,” President Bush’s moratorium more overtly 
 
 39. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
at 4435 (ordering a freeze on new rules and the withdrawal of regulations that had not been 
published); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7702 (same); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of 
Agencies Described in Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6074 (same). 
 40. Compare Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7702 (suspending for sixty days the effective dates of final 
regulations that had already been published), with Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4435 (urging agencies to “consider” extending the 
effective dates of final regulations for sixty days). 
 41. See President George Bush, Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government 
Regulation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 166 (Jan. 28, 1992); see also President’s Regulatory Moratorium, 
ADMIN. L. NEWS, Spring 1992, at 4 (describing President Bush’s moratorium).  
 42. Bush, supra note 41, at 167 (directing agencies to “refrain from issuing any proposed or 
final rule” during a ninety-day period).  
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claimed to address the country’s economic woes through reduced 
regulation.43 
Another aspect of President Bush’s moratorium differentiated it 
from the regulatory moratoria issued by other presidents at the 
beginning of their administrations: whereas the moratoria issued by 
Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama had all 
been issued relatively quietly in a behind-the-scenes fashion, 
President George H.W. Bush repeatedly highlighted his moratorium 
to the public. For example, the first President Bush announced the 
moratorium publicly and associated it with his plans for economic 
recovery during a State of the Union Address before Congress in 
January 1992, stating, “We must have a short-term plan to address 
our immediate needs and heat up the economy. And then we need a 
longer term plan to keep combustion going and to guarantee our 
place in the world economy.”44 
President Bush succeeded in getting his moratorium noticed by 
the public, but initial reaction to the moratorium included significant 
opposition by those who were “cynical,” with some suggesting that 
the program was “simply an election-year ploy”45 and a political 
“gimmick.”46 For example, the New York Times reported that 
although President Bush had been “anything but hawk-eyed against 
Government rules” in the first three years of his presidency, the 
moratorium represented a sharp reversal of course “at the outset of 
[the] election year, with the economy flagging, the business 
community demanding relief and the right wing of the Republican 
Party challenging [the president’s] ways.”47 
Not all reactions to the moratorium, however, were negative.48 
Numerous members of the House of Representatives called on 
 
 43. President’s Regulatory Moratorium, supra note 41, at 4.  
 44. President George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of 
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 156, 159 (Jan. 28, 1992).  
 45. President’s Regulatory Moratorium, supra note 41, at 8. 
 46. David E. Rosenbaum & Keith Schneider, Bush Is Extending Regulation Freeze as a 
Great Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at A1; see also Douglas Jehl, Bush Extends His 
Suspension of New Government Regulation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A32 (“[A]s Bush 
spoke of taking a ‘wrecking ball’ to rigid government rule-making, senior officials inside the 
White House hinted at another motivation when they referred to new polls showing public 
distaste for such regulation.” (quoting President Bush)).  
 47. Rosenbaum & Schneider, supra note 46. 
 48. See id. (“Michael J. Boskin, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and a 
coordinator of the review process, said, ‘In this 90-day period alone, dozens of regulatory 
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President Bush to extend the moratorium for one year.49 They 
asserted that “increasing Federal regulations require[d] private 
enterprises to expend a growing level of resources to meet regulatory 
mandates, rather than investing in new capital [or] expanding 
operations, therefore inhibiting the creation of new jobs.”50 
Ultimately, President Bush chose to extend the moratorium, 
announcing before cameras during an April 1992 address from the 
Rose Garden that he was “ordering a 120-day extension of the 
moratorium on new regulations,”51 thereby turning the moratorium 
from a three- to a seven-month freeze on rulemaking.52 In justifying 
the extension, President Bush—flanked by White House officials, 
including Vice President Dan Quayle and White House Counsel 
Boyden Gray—proclaimed the ninety-day moratorium to be a 
resounding success, and he argued that “[t]o ensure that recovery 
continues and is strengthened, to ensure that we can create new jobs, 
we must continue our course of regulatory reform.”53 Specifically, he 
claimed, “We estimate that the reforms we’ve set in motion just since 
January 28 will save consumers about $15 billion to $20 billion a year. 
That’s a savings of $225 to $300 per year for the average American 
family.”54 
These claims of victory did not go unchallenged. Indeed, during 
the very Rose Garden ceremony in which President Bush was 
declaring success,55 the Bush administration’s celebration was derailed 
when “Fred Krupp, the executive director of the Environmental 
Defense Fund, unexpectedly stepped to the microphone and 
denounced the extension of the regulatory moratorium as a sell out to 
 
reforms and initiatives were taken that removed unnecessary obstacles to business expansion 
and job creation.’” (quoting Boskin)).  
 49. H.R. Con. Res. 307, 102d Cong. (1992). 
 50. Id.  
 51. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 663, 
664 (Apr. 29, 1992); see also Andrew Rosenthal, Outsider Steals Bush’s Rose Garden Scene, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A18 (“In its drive to convey the image of a President offering an 
agenda for the future, the White House sent President Bush into the Rose Garden today for a 
much-advertised announcement on what he called ‘one of my top priorities’—Government 
deregulation.” (quoting President Bush)).  
 52. A video of President Bush announcing the extension can be found on C-SPAN’s 
website. See Regulatory Moratorium Announcement, C-SPAN (Apr. 29, 1992), http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/25791-1.  
 53. Bush, supra note 51, at 664. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 665. 
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big business.”56 Specifically, Krupp, who had “helped the Bush 
Administration draft its position on acid rain during negotiations on 
the 1990 Clean Air Act,” asserted that the freeze was a “‘wholesale 
handout to the American business community’ at the expense of 
clean air and water.”57 Krupp’s statement reportedly left two of the 
president’s top aides “fuming.”58 
Outside the context of the Rose Garden ceremony, much of the 
controversy surrounding President Bush’s moratorium centered on 
how much impact, if any, the moratorium was actually having—with 
many attacking the veracity of the president’s claims of billions in cost 
savings per year. Some policy analysts argued that the moratorium 
had “had little visible effect in reversing the sharp growth of 
regulation during the first three years of [Bush’s] Presidency.”59 In 
addition, Public Citizen, a national nonprofit consumer group 
founded by Ralph Nader, decried President Bush’s claim of cost 
savings as “pure voodoo accounting,”60 arguing that the moratorium 
was “costing the nation dearly in human life and a damaged 
environment” rather than saving money.61 Specifically, Public Citizen 
and OMB Watch asserted that “[n]o claim of savings from the 
moratorium should be counted until the administration shows how it 
got its numbers, and until the costs to public health and safety and to 
the environment of not regulating are also factored in.”62 
Despite all of the controversy, President Bush stood behind his 
regulatory moratorium. In fact, he continued calling public attention 
to it as he faced reelection, stating, for example, during his acceptance 
speech at the Republican National Convention in August 1992 that he 
would further extend the moratorium for one year through August 
 
 56. Robert V. Percival, Separation of Powers, the Presidency and the Environment, 21 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 25, 40 (2001). 
 57. Rosenthal, supra note 51 (quoting Krupp).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Robert D. Hershey Jr., Regulations March On, Despite a Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 1992, at D1.  
 60. NANCY WATZMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH & CHRISTINE TRIANO, OMB 
WATCH, VOODOO ACCOUNTING: THE TOLL OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S REGULATORY 
MORATORIUM, JANUARY–AUGUST 1992, at v (1992). 
 61. Id. at i. 
 62. NANCY WATZMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH & CHRISTINE TRIANO, OMB 
WATCH, THE HIDDEN STORY: WHAT BUSH AND QUAYLE DON’T SAY ABOUT THE 
REGULATORY MORATORIUM 4 (1992).  
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1993.63 After the convention, a White House spokeswoman clarified 
that the “announcement at the convention had functionally 
extend[ed] the moratorium,”64 and Vice President Quayle 
subsequently followed up more formally by issuing a memorandum to 
all department heads stating that agencies “should continue to follow 
the procedures and substantive standards established” in the 
president’s original memorandum.65 Hence, President Bush’s 
experiment with an executive-driven moratorium ultimately lasted 
one year in all, and it would have continued until at least August 1993 
had President Clinton not been inaugurated in January 1993.66  
2. Legislative Calls for Hard Regulatory Moratoria.  After the use 
of executive-driven regulatory moratoria in 1981 and 1992, it was 
perhaps just a matter of time before Congress too would start 
thinking about regulatory moratoria. And this is indeed exactly what 
happened. Beginning in the 1990s, various legislative proposals for 
hard regulatory moratoria surfaced in Congress. As this Section 
describes, though none of these legislative proposals has been enacted 
into law, their mere introduction suggests that Congress has taken 
 
 63. See President George H.W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at 
the Republican National Convention in Houston, 2 PUB. PAPERS, 1380, 1384 (Aug. 20, 1992) (“I 
believe that small business needs relief from taxation, regulation, and litigation. And thus, I will 
extend for one year the freeze on paperwork and unnecessary Federal regulation that I imposed 
last winter.”).  
 64. Regulatory Moratorium Remains in Effect Despite Lack of Official Bush Memorandum, 
DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Sept. 1, 1992, at 170, available at LEXIS, Doc. No. 1992 DER 170 d20.  
 65. Quayle Sends Memo Reminding Agencies To Comply with Regulatory Moratorium, 
DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Dec. 4, 1992, at 234, available at LEXIS, Doc. No. 1992 DER 234 d33 
(quoting Quayle).  
 66. Even though it appears that President Bush is the only president to date to have 
ordered a long-term regulatory moratorium outside the context of a political transition, 
President Obama reportedly gave the strategy some consideration. Specifically, according to the 
New York Times, in the fall of 2011, President Obama—when faced with an ailing economy and 
a bid for reelection—considered proposing a regulatory moratorium on some regulations that 
especially affected the economy. Jeff Zeleny, A Campaign Challenge: Defining Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, at A24. The president’s aides, however, promptly denied the New York 
Times report. Sam Stein, White House Denies Reports It’s Considering Regulation Moratorium, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:39 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/
07/obama-jobs-speech-regulation-moratorium_n_952168.html. In addition, at least one 
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, Governor Rick Perry of Texas, 
campaigned “calling for a six-month moratorium on federal business regulations that he said 
were holding back job growth nationally.” Rick Perry Touts Jobs Record Ahead of 2012, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:05 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/
rick-perry-jobs-record_n_927271.html.  
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note of the executive’s use of regulatory moratoria as a potential tool 
for political control of the administrative state. 
a. Legislative Proposals in the 1990s.  On April 8, 1992, a 
concurrent resolution was proposed in the House that would have 
expressed Congress’s view that the president should extend for one 
year the provisions of his ninety-day moratorium on unnecessary new 
federal regulations.67 This resolution ended up being unnecessary 
because President Bush extended his moratorium for another 120 
days without the passage of any formal legislative prodding.68 
Subsequently, after Republicans swept the 1994 midterm 
elections and gained control of both houses of Congress, the new 
Republican leaders wrote a letter to President Clinton in December 
1994, urging him to issue an executive order that would impose a 
moratorium on new rules for the first one hundred days of the 104th 
Congress.69 President Clinton responded to the Republican leaders’ 
demands via a letter from Sally Katzen, the administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).70 In that letter, 
Katzen noted President Clinton’s opposition to imposing a hard 
regulatory moratorium, asserting that “a moratorium is a blunderbuss 
that could work in unintended ways.”71 
Undeterred by President Clinton’s response, House Majority 
Whip Tom DeLay, along with numerous other Republicans, decided 
to take matters into his own hands by introducing a bill on January 9, 
1995—House Bill 450, the Regulatory Transition Act of 199572—
calling for a legislatively imposed regulatory moratorium.73 
Reportedly, the bill had initially been drafted by Gordon Gooch, a 
lobbyist for the petrochemical industry who was part of Project 
 
 67. H.R. Con. Res. 307, 102d Cong. (1992). 
 68. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
 69. Melissa Healy, GOP Seeks Moratorium on New Federal Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 1994, at A32; see also Peter Grier, GOP Hopes To Unspool Government Red Tape, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1994, at 1 (“The GOP, in fact, is pushing the White House 
to freeze all new rules for 100 days . . . .”). 
 70. Letter from Sally Katzen, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. 
& Budget, to Rep. Newt Gingrich (Dec. 14, 1994), available at http://archives.clintonpresidential
center.org/?u=121594-letter-from-katzen-on-regulatory-moratorium.htm.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 73. Id. § 2. 
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Relief, a corporate lobbying movement that aimed to roll back 
government regulation.74 
As introduced in the House, section 2 of the bill set forth 
congressional findings, concluding, for example, “that effective steps 
for improving the efficiency and proper management of Government 
operations . . . will be promoted if a moratorium on new rulemaking 
actions is imposed and an inventory of such action is conducted.”75 
Then section 3 went on to set forth the specific terms of the proposed 
moratorium, declaring that federal agencies could “not take any 
regulatory rulemaking action” until June 30, 1995, unless the 
rulemaking was exempted from the act through a specific exception.76 
Section 5 provided specific exemptions, making clear that the 
moratorium would not apply to rulemaking actions “necessary 
because of an imminent threat to health or safety or other 
emergency” or “necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws.”77 
In the debate over the bill, the executive-driven moratoria of 
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush were cited as precedent. A 
representative from Illinois, for example, noted that “[r]egulatory 
moratoria are not new” and that “Presidents Reagan and Bush each 
had a moratorium on regulations”—although the proposed bill would 
have gone even further than the prior executive-driven moratoria 
had.78 In addition, testifying before a House committee considering 
the bill in January 1995, former White House Counsel Boyden 
Gray—who had stood by President Bush’s side in the Rose Garden 
when the president extended his 1992 moratorium—pointed out that 
[i]n 1981 and again in 1992, [a moratorium had] permitted the White 
House to tell agencies, look, take a look at all the existing rules that 
you haven’t revisited in a decade or two or three and redirect some 
 
 74. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values 
Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 733, 743 (1996); see also Martin Walker, Licence To Pollute the Free World, GUARDIAN 
(London), Sept. 6, 1995, at 4 (“Gordon Gooch, who lobbies for the petrochemical industry, 
drafted the first effort—a moratorium on any new federal regulations of any kind.”). 
Representative DeLay apparently acknowledged that “lobbyists offered suggestions for the 
regulatory reform bill, but [took] issue with assertions that they ‘drafted’ the legislation in his 
office.” Argument Turns to Shove, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 10, 1997, at A7. 
 75. H.R. 450 § 2.  
 76. Id. § 3(a).  
 77. Id. § 5(a)(2). 
 78. 141 CONG. REC. 5645 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cardiss Collins).  
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of your attention, at least for a little time, on reevaluating existing 
rules.79 
Ultimately, the bill passed the House by a vote of 276 to 146 
approximately a month and a half after being introduced.80 But the 
Senate counterpart to House Bill 450—Senate Bill 21981—did not fare 
so well. Senate Bill 219, which was originally introduced on January 
12, 1995, called for a moratorium on regulations, subject to specified 
exemptions, that would last until the summer of 1995—a proposal 
similar to that of House Bill 450.82 A hearing on the bill was held in 
February 1995 before the Senate’s Committee on Governmental 
Affairs,83 and one common theme that emerged among detractors 
during the hearing was the concern that a moratorium might be too 
blunt. For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman opened the hearing 
by stressing the broad bipartisan consensus that the regulatory 
process needed reform, but he argued that “to just say, ‘stop’ 
endangers a lot of values and undercuts one of the fundamental roles 
of government, which is protection of the public from threats that 
they cannot protect themselves from.”84 Similarly, Sally Katzen of 
OIRA argued that a moratorium would be a “distraction” and a 
“detour” from the real goal of improving the regulatory system 
because it would spawn numerous questions, such as questions about 
the meaning of the exceptions to the moratorium.85 
In contrast, supporters argued that a moratorium made good 
sense because it would force agencies to review and do away with 
unnecessary regulations that burdened the economy and industry. For 
example, a representative from the trucking industry supported the 
moratorium, asserting that “Federal regulators are strangling 
 
 79. The Regulatory Transition Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Econ. 
Growth, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 
104th Cong. 160 (1995) (statement of C. Boyden Gray, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering).  
 80. 141 CONG. REC. 5880 (1995); see also John H. Cushman Jr., House Votes To Freeze 
Regulations as Democrats Fail To Gain Health and Safety Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
1995, at 7 (“The House of Representatives voted today to freeze most new Federal regulations 
for the rest of the year, with Republicans and Democrats arguing to the debate’s bitter end over 
whether the proposal would endanger the public.”). 
 81. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 82. Id. 
 83. S. 219—Regulatory Transition Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995).  
 84. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Lieberman).  
 85. Id. at 8 (statement of Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget).  
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transportation in this country” and that “[t]he Federal rulemaking 
process has spun out of control and it is costing American jobs, 
strangling small businesses, and raising prices for every one of us.”86 
In March 1995, the Senate committee reported favorably on the 
bill and recommended some amendments.87 A minority of the 
committee, however, argued against the moratorium, concluding that 
although “[w]e should fix the regulatory process, we should not freeze 
it and the benefits that flow from it.”88 In the end, the general 
sentiment expressed in the minority report—that regulatory reform 
was needed but that a moratorium was not the right way to achieve 
it—won out when a major amendment was proposed to the bill 
providing for a forty-five-day congressional review of certain federal 
regulations instead of a generalized moratorium.89 This amended 
version of the bill, which passed the Senate by a vote of 100 to 0,90 did 
not call for a hard moratorium, as did the House bill, but rather 
proposed that certain significant regulations—defined essentially in 
terms of economic effect91—would require a forty-five-day 
congressional-review period before taking effect.92 Although the 
Senate’s version of the bill could be seen as calling for a moratorium 
because it proposed to suspend the effective date of certain significant 
regulations pending a congressional-review period, it was not a true 
moratorium in any sense of the word.93 Hence, the House’s desire to 
 
 86. Id. at 39 (statement of Thomas J. Donohue, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
American Trucking Association, Inc.).  
 87. S. REP. NO. 104-15, at 1–3 (1995).  
 88. Id. at 32. 
 89. 141 CONG. REC. 9312–14 (1995). 
 90. 141 CONG. REC. 9580 (1995).  
 91. See Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. § 106(2) (1995) (defining 
“significant rule[s]”). 
 92. Compare Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. § 3(a) (1995) 
(“Until the end of the moratorium period, a Federal agency may not take any regulatory 
rulemaking action, unless an exception is provided under section 5 [of this bill].”), with S. 219 
§ 103 (noting that “significant” rules may only take effect after a forty-five-day review period). 
 93. See 141 CONG. REC. 13,265 (1995) (statement of Rep. William F. Clinger, Jr.) (arguing 
that the Senate version of the moratorium was, “frankly, hard to characterize as a regulatory 
moratorium”); id. at 13,266 (statement of Rep. Colin Peterson) (noting that the Senate bill 
provides “for a different approach, which is not all bad, which asks for a congressional review 
period for new regulations”); President William J. Clinton, Statement on Senate Action To 
Reject a Regulatory Moratorium, 1 PUB. PAPERS 416, 416 (Mar. 29, 1995) (asserting that a 
forty-five-day congressional review period—“not the blunt instrument of a moratorium”—was 
“the right way to reform regulation”). Consistent with this sense, federal and state bills and 
statutes calling for the extension or suspension of the effective dates of regulations to enable 
legislative review of regulations are not treated as regulatory moratoria for purposes of this 
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impose a long-term regulatory moratorium on federal regulations 
failed. Still, the Senate’s desire to institute a congressional-review 
period to enable Congress to consider whether to affirmatively 
disapprove significant rules—via a joint resolution passed by both 
houses and presented to the president—was eventually codified in the 
Congressional Review Act.94 
b. Legislative Proposals in the First Session of the 112th Congress.  
After the spurt of legislative activity in the mid-1990s focusing on 
regulatory moratoria,95 congressional attention given to the topic 
tapered off, with very few legislative proposals involving regulatory 
moratoria surfacing between 1996 and 2010.96 But after the economy 
again took a turn for the worse and many voters began voicing 
 
Article. In contrast, short-term, executive suspensions of the effective dates of regulations to 
enable executive review are treated as regulatory moratoria for purposes of this Article. The 
reason for this different treatment of legislative suspension of the effective date of a regulation 
and executive suspension is as follows: When the legislative branch, via a statute like the 
Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006)), extends the point at which certain regulations can become effective 
in order to enable review of a regulation, see id. sec. 251, § 801(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)) (mandating a waiting period before a “major rule” can take effect), it 
does not impose a moratorium on regulatory activity in general but rather merely statutorily 
defines the effective date of the covered regulations. For example, no one would argue that 
Congress has implemented a moratorium by providing that substantive rules shall not be 
effective until at least thirty days after the required publication of the rule has occurred. See 
Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006) (“The required publication or 
service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date . . . .”).  
 94. Congressional Review Act, 110 Stat. 868. The issue of congressional review of 
regulations came to the forefront again in the 112th Congress when Republicans proposed 
legislation that would halt all new major regulations until the regulations had been affirmatively 
approved by Congress—rather than simply giving Congress the chance to disapprove significant 
regulations, as the Congressional Review Act does. See Regulations from the Executive in Need 
of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10, 112th Cong. § 801(b)(1) (2011) (“A major rule shall not take 
effect unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval . . . .”). This bill passed the 
House in December 2011 and was sent to the Senate. See 157 CONG. REC. H8237 (daily ed. Dec. 
7, 2011) (noting that 241 representatives voted in favor of the bill). 
 95. See, e.g., S. 219 (requiring a review period before a “significant rule” can take effect); 
H.R. 450 (proposing a moratorium on federal rulemaking); Stop Regulating Our Small 
Businesses Act of 1995, H.R. 839, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a moratorium on regulations 
related to small businesses). 
 96. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1649, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing an amendment to House rules 
to establish a House Committee on Regulatory Review and American Jobs that would 
(1) review all final and proposed federal regulations to determine whether such regulations 
would result in the loss of U.S. jobs, and (2) impose a moratorium on such regulations); 
Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing that midnight rules—defined as 
agency rules adopted within the final ninety days of the final term a president serves—“shall not 
take effect until 90 days after [a new] agency head [has been] appointed by the new President”).  
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concerns about overregulation,97 this quiet period came to an end in 
the 112th Congress, when moratoria burst back onto the legislative 
agenda. Specifically, in the first session of the 112th Congress alone, 
at least fifteen bills introduced by Republicans called for the 
imposition of a generalized regulatory moratorium.98 
In January 2011, Representative Don Young, a Republican from 
Alaska, introduced House Bill 213, the Regulation Audit Revive 
Economy Act of 2011 (RARE).99 The ten-page bill proposed to 
impose a regulatory moratorium for at least two years after the date 
of enactment with some specified exceptions.100 Its language borrowed 
heavily from House Bill 450 and Senate Bill 219 from the 104th 
Congress.101 
At least fourteen additional legislative proposals calling for 
regulatory moratoria followed over the course of the next nine 
months in the Senate and the House.102 These bills, with titles such as 
the Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011103 and the 
Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011,104 were 
similar in the sense that they all proposed generalized moratoria. Yet 
four distinct issues seemed to divide the various bills into different 
camps. 
First, the bills differed regarding the length of their proposed 
moratoria. Many of the bills specified a set period of time for a 
 
 97. For a description of polls demonstrating rising concerns about overregulation and the 
economy, see infra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.  
 98. This number counts bills introduced in the House or in the Senate as unique bills—
meaning that a bill introduced in the House and the same counterpart bill introduced in the 
Senate are counted as two different bills. 
 99. Regulation Audit Revive Economy Act of 2011, H.R. 213, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Compare Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. (1995), with 
Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 102. H.R. 3518, 112th Cong. (2011); Jobs Through Growth Act, H.R. 3400, 112th Cong. 
(2011); Long-Term Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2011, S. 1786, 112th Cong. tit. VI 
(2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257, 112th Cong. (2011); Jobs Through Growth 
Act, S. 1720, 112th Cong. (2011); Job Creation and Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, H.R. 3194, 
112th Cong. (2011); Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong. 
(2011); H.R. Res. 402, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th 
Cong. (2011); Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011, H.R. 2898, 112th 
Cong. (2011); Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011, S. 1438, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Restoring Economic Certainty Act of 2011, H.R. 1281, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulation 
Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 103. H.R. 3181. 
 104. H.R. 2898.  
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proposed moratorium, such as a one- or two-year period.105 In 
contrast, a few bills called for a moratorium keyed to the country’s 
unemployment rate.106 For example, the Regulation Moratorium and 
Jobs Preservation Act of 2011107 called for a moratorium on any 
significant new federal regulations until the national unemployment 
rate had fallen to 7.7 percent or below.108 
Second, the bills differed as to whether only major or significant 
rules should be covered, or whether all rules—regardless of their 
significance—should be targeted. Many bills targeted only significant 
regulations, including regulations that would have an annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more or that would “adversely affect 
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, 
local, or tribal governments or communities.”109 In contrast, other bills 
declined to impose any kind of a significance threshold. For example, 
one bill covered all regulations “that would affect employment 
levels,”110 and another bill banned agencies from putting into force 
“any rule,” with narrow, specified exceptions.111 
Third, the bills differed as to which otherwise-covered 
regulations should be exempted from the reach of a moratorium. 
Most of the bills recognized the need to provide some exemptions or 
waivers,112 but the bills differed in terms of the types and scope of 
 
 105. See, e.g., H.R. 3518 § 1 (proposing a two-year moratorium); S. 1786 § 603 (proposing a 
one-year moratorium); H.R. 3257 § 3(2) (proposing a moratorium to last until January 21, 
2013); H.R. 3194 § 4(3) (proposing a moratorium with an end date of January 20, 2013); H.R. 
3181 § 6(3) (providing for a minimum of a two-year moratorium); S. 1538 § 3 (proposing a one-
year “time-out” period for regulations); S. 1531 § 2 (proposing a two-year freeze on new rules or 
regulations); H.R. 1281 § 6(2) (proposing a moratorium that would last until the end of the 
“two-year period beginning on the date occurring 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act”); H.R. 1235 § 2 (proposing a moratorium through January 31, 2013).  
 106. See, e.g., H.R. 3400 § 202(a) (“No agency may take any significant regulatory action, 
until the Bureau of Labor Statistics average of monthly unemployment rates for any quarter 
beginning after the date of enactment of this Act is equal to or less than 7.7 percent.”); S. 1720 
§ 3503(a) (same); H.R. 2898 § 3(a) (same); S. 1438 § 3(a) (same). 
 107. S. 1438. 
 108. Id. § 3(a). 
 109. S. 1538; accord H.R. 3400 § 201(3); S. 1720 § 3502(3); H.R. 3194 § 4(2); H.R. 2898 
§ 2(3)(A); S. 1438 § 2(3). 
 110. H.R. 3518 § 1.  
 111. Regulation Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (emphasis 
added).  
 112. H.R. 3518 is an example of a bill that fails to provide exemptions. It proposes a 
moratorium that apparently would cover all rules “that would affect employment levels”—
without any specified exceptions. H.R. 3518 § 1. 
WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  1:22 AM 
2012] REGULATORY MORATORIA 1905 
specified exemptions. Many of the bills exempted regulations that 
would be necessary “due to an imminent threat due to human health 
or safety, or any other emergency”113 or regulations that would be 
“necessary for the enforcement of a criminal law.”114 Some of the bills 
exempted regulations that would foster job creation or economic 
growth;115 others exempted rules pertaining to agency organization, 
management, or personnel matters;116 and a few contained exemptions 
for regulations involving civil rights.117 In addition, some of the bills 
included exemptions for regulations pertaining to military or foreign-
affairs functions,118 as well as regulations limited to interpreting, 
implementing, or administering the Internal Revenue Code.119 
Finally, the bills differed as to whether they would create private 
rights of action. Many of the bills said nothing about this question.120 
 
 113. H.R. 2898 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(B); accord H.R. 3194 § 3 (providing for exemptions in cases of 
“an imminent threat to human health or safety, or any other emergency”); Stop the Regulation 
Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2011) (providing for 
exemptions in emergencies as certified by the administrator of OIRA); Regulation Audit 
Revive Economy Act of 2011, H.R. 213, 112th Cong. § 4(a) (2011) (establishing an “emergency 
exception”); see also H.R. Res. 402, 112th Cong. (2011) (exempting rules that “provide for 
emergency services or the defense of the Nation”); H.R. 3400 § 203 (“The President may waive 
the application of [the moratorium] to any significant regulatory action, if the 
President . . . determines that the waiver is necessary on the basis of national security or a 
national emergency . . . .”); H.R. 2898 § 4 (same); S. 1438 § 4 (same).  
 114. H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(B); H.R. 2898 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(B); H.R. 213 § 4(a); accord H.R. 3181 
§ 3(a)(2)(B).  
 115. See H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(C) (exempting regulations that have as their principal effect 
“fostering private sector job creation and the enhancement of the competitiveness of workers in 
the United States” or “encouraging economic growth”); cf. H.R. 2898 § 2(3)(A) (defining 
“significant regulatory action[s]” to which the moratorium applies as, inter alia, those actions 
that “adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, [or] jobs”).  
 116. E.g., Restoring Economic Certainty Act of 2011, H.R. 1281, 112th Cong. § 6(3)(B)(ii) 
(2011) (exempting regulations “that are limited to agency organization, management, or 
personnel matters”). 
 117. See, e.g., H.R. 3181 § 3(c) (noting that the regulatory moratorium would not apply to 
rulemaking or rules that “establish or enforce any statutory rights against discrimination on the 
basis of age, race, religion, gender, national origin, or handicapped or disability status except 
such rulemaking actions or rules that establish, lead to, or otherwise rely on the use of a quota 
or preference based on [those characteristics]”); H.R. 213 § 4(c) (same).  
 118. See H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(D) (exempting regulations that pertain “to a military or foreign 
affairs function”); H.R. 1281 § 6(3)(B)(i) (same). 
 119. H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(E); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th Cong. 
§ 4(a)(1)(E) (2011).  
 120. See, e.g., H.R. 3518, 112th Cong. (2011); Long-Term Surface Transportation Extension 
Act of 2011, S. 1786, 112th Cong. tit. VI (2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257, 
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3194; H.R. 3181; Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531, 
112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. (2011).  
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Of those that did, some allowed private rights of action, stating that 
“[a]ny person that is adversely affected or aggrieved by any 
significant regulatory action in violation of this Act is entitled to 
judicial review.”121 In contrast, other bills expressly disallowed such 
actions, stating that “[n]o private right of action may be brought 
against any Federal agency for a violation of this Act.”122  
Neither the Senate nor the House has come together behind any 
of these bills. Nor have the bills managed to gather bipartisan 
momentum. Nonetheless, they demonstrate that legislative proposals 
for regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the legislative 
consciousness, with Republicans in Congress introducing the bills. 
B. Moratoria at the State Level 
State executives and legislatures have also started looking to and 
relying upon both hard and soft regulatory moratoria as means of 
exerting control over state regulatory activity. 
1. Executive-Driven Moratoria in the States.  Similar to the 
moratoria at the federal level, most state-level moratoria have 
followed from executive orders rather than legislative command. As 
this Section describes, most of these executive moratoria have been 
soft rather than hard moratoria. Some state moratoria that started out 
as soft moratoria, however, have been transformed into hard 
moratoria. In addition, a few governors, including Washington 
Governor Christine Gregoire and Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval, 
have chosen to call outright for hard moratoria spanning a year or 
more. 
a. Soft Gubernatorial Moratoria.  In the mid-1990s—on the heels 
of President Bush’s one-year moratorium on federal regulation in 
1992123 and around the time that the 104th Congress was considering 
legislation to impose a moratorium on federal regulatory activity124—
some governors experimented with imposing short-term moratoria 
upon coming into office. One prominent example of this phenomenon 
occurred in New York, where on January 5, 1995, the newly elected 
 
 121. Jobs Through Growth Act, H.R. 3400, 112th Cong. § 204(b) (2011); Jobs Through 
Growth Act, S. 1720, 112th Cong. § 3505(b) (2011); Regulation Moratorium and Jobs 
Preservation Act of 2011, S. 1438, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011).  
 122. H.R. 1281 § 7; H.R. 213 § 7. 
 123. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 73–95 and accompanying text. 
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governor, George Pataki, implemented a ninety-day moratorium, 
banning the “adoption of any rule or regulation” by any agency over 
which he had control with certain specified exceptions.125 Although 
Governor Pataki, a Republican, issued the order after taking the 
governor’s office out of Democratic hands, he did not justify the 
moratorium in terms of a general need to review regulations issued by 
the prior administration. Rather, he justified it in economic terms. 
Specifically, he noted that “excessive rules and regulations have 
unduly burdened the State’s economy and imposed needless costs on 
the businesses and citizens of this State,” and he stressed the need to 
“review all proposed rules and regulations to ensure that no rule or 
regulation is more demanding than required to meet legislative 
goals.”126 Governor Pataki had campaigned on a promise to “be 
business friendly,” and according to news reports, the moratorium 
was a means of following up on his campaign promise.127 Indeed, 
business leaders reportedly hailed the move “as the first step to a 
better business climate.”128  
Governor Pataki subsequently determined that his 
administration could not complete a review of all regulations within 
the ninety-day period, and he extended the initial freeze through 
September 1995 via subsequent orders.129 This meant that his initial 
 
 125. Exec. Order No. 2, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.2 (1995); see also GEORGE 
E. PATAKI, MESSAGE TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (1995) (announcing to the legislature that he 
would sign an “Executive Order declaring a moratorium on all new regulations—except 
regulations needed to protect the public health and safety or rules that promote new jobs and 
economic activity”); Patricia E. Salkin, News from the States, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 
1995, at 8, 8 (noting that Governor Pataki ordered a moratorium on proposed rules and 
regulations via his second executive order).  
 126. Exec. Order No. 2, tit. 9, § 5.2. 
 127. See Precious, supra note 10 (“Living up to his campaign promise to be business 
friendly . . . Gov. George Pataki on Thursday placed a 90-day moratorium on new regulations 
being issued by state agencies.”); see also Patricia Salkin, Regulatory Reform Continues To 
Dominate Political Agenda in New York, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 10, 10 
(“When Governor George Pataki campaigned for office, he promised regulatory relief and 
reform to the businesses and local governments in the State.”).  
 128. Jessica Ancker, Business Leaders Hail Pataki Order, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1995, at A12.  
 129. See Exec. Order No. 7, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.7 (1995) (extending 
“Executive Order No. 2 in full force and effect up to and including June 30, 1995”); Exec. Order 
No. 14, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.14 (1995) (extending “Executive Order No. 2 
in full force and effect up to and including Sept. 30, 1995”); see also Pataki Aims To Cut into 
Some Red Tape, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Dec. 2, 1995, at B2 (noting in December 1995 
that even though the Pataki administration’s “moratorium on issuing new regulations” was over, 
agencies would face a “rigorous set of guidelines designed to discourage the creation of too 
much governmental red tape”); Michael Slackman, Pataki’s Regulatory Revolution, NEWSDAY, 
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soft moratorium ultimately morphed into a longer-term freeze that 
was coupled with numerous other initiatives designed to achieve 
regulatory reform, such as a focus on cost-benefit analysis.130 
On January 25, 1995—around the same time that Governor 
Pataki issued his initial moratorium in New York—Rhode Island’s 
newly elected Republican governor, Lincoln Almond, issued an order 
just days after taking the governorship out of Democratic hands.131 In 
the order, Governor Almond declared “a moratorium on the issuance 
of any new regulations” so that “each department can assess the need 
for all current regulations and eliminate or modify those which are 
not warranted.”132 Like Governor Pataki, Governor Almond justified 
the order largely in terms of improving the economy and combating 
overregulation, asserting that “a strong and growing economy is 
essential to job formation and the well-being of Rhode Island” and 
that “government over-regulation poses a threat to the health of 
Rhode Island businesses.”133 
Since 2002, many more governors have imposed short-term 
regulatory moratoria in their states immediately upon coming into 
office. And they too have all either expressly or implicitly pointed to 
concerns about the economy, unnecessary burdens, or overregulation 
when freezing rules at the beginning of their new administrations. 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in California was one such 
governor. Immediately upon coming into office in November 2003, 
Governor Schwarzenegger issued a regulatory moratorium via 
executive order that imposed a 180-day freeze on rulemaking, 
requesting among other things that agencies cease processing 
 
Aug. 6, 1995, at A21 (noting that Governor Pataki’s moratorium would “continue[] at least until 
the end of September”). 
 130. See Slackman, supra note 129 (“Gov. George Pataki is leading a quiet revolution by 
moving aggressively to rearrange the state’s regulatory landscape.”); Roy Yancey, State Shapes 
Rules To Weigh the Price of New Regulations, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1995, at 
B2 (“Taking a page from the federal book, the Pataki administration is preparing how-to 
handbooks on cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments to be distributed next month to various 
state agencies.”).  
 131. Exec. Order No. 95-3 (R.I. Jan. 25, 1995), available at http://www.uri.edu/library/
special_collections/almond/execord/95-03.html; see also Rhode Island Governor Inauguration, 
C-SPAN (Jan. 3, 1995), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/62525-1 (relaying Governor 
Almond’s inaugural address on January 3, 1995); Governor Bruce Sundlun Papers 1990-1995: 
Biographical Note, UNIV. OF R.I., http://www.uri.edu/library/special_collections/political_
papers/sundlun/historical.html (noting that Governor Sundlun succeeded the Democrat Bruce 
Sundlun). 
 132. Exec. Order No. 95-3. 
 133. Id.  
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proposed rules and suspend or postpone the effective date of 
published regulations that had not yet become effective.134 Governor 
Schwarzenegger, a Republican who had replaced a Democrat,135 
justified the moratorium by asserting that “the increased costs 
associated with California’s regulatory environment ha[d] diminished 
competition in the national and global marketplaces for the State’s 
goods and services.”136 He also noted that “with the onerous impact of 
over-regulation on the daily lives of Californians, it is time to reassess 
the system of State Government that is perceived to work against 
businesses and inhibit growth and economic prosperity.”137 
Several years later, in January 2009, Arizona’s newly elected 
Republican governor, Janice Brewer, announced a moratorium just 
one day after taking the office out of Democratic hands.138 Her 
memorandum asked agencies, among other things, to refrain through 
April 30, 2009, from sending proposed or final rules for publication 
and to withdraw proposed rules that had been sent but had not yet 
been published.139 She justified the order by highlighting the necessity 
of “ensur[ing] that [her] appointees ha[d] the opportunity to review 
any new or pending rules.”140 At the end of her order, however, she 
also noted that independent agencies were welcome to comply 
voluntarily in the interest “of sound regulatory practice and the 
avoidance of costly, burdensome, or unnecessary rules.”141 Hence, her 
motives seemed to hint at a desire to act against overregulation. 
Through a combination of legislative acts and additional executive 
orders, the moratorium in Arizona was extended through June 
2012—meaning that it turned from a short-term, executive-driven 
moratorium keyed to a political transition into a long-term 
 
 134. Exec. Order No. S-2-03 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/
executive-order/3381.  
 135. History of California’s Constitutional Officers, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/ca-roster/2010/pdf/01c-his_off.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 136. Exec. Order No. S-2-03. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Accomplishments, OFFICE OF ARIZ. GOVERNOR 
JANICE K. BREWER, http://www.azgovernor.gov/About/Gov_Accomplishments.asp (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2012) (stating that Governor Brewer took office on January 21, 2009, and announced a 
regulatory moratorium the next day); Janet Napolitano, WASH. POST, http://www.washington
post.com/politics/janet-napolitano/gIQAynPe9O_topic.html#path-to-power (last visited Apr. 11, 
2012) (noting that Governor Brewer would succeed Democrat Janet Napolitano). 
 139. Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs., 
15 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 342, 342 (Jan. 30, 2009).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
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moratorium that was expressly tied to the economy and 
deregulation.142 
One year after Governor Brewer first announced the initial 
moratorium in Arizona, New Jersey’s newly elected governor, Chris 
Christie, another Republican who had replaced a Democrat,143 
declared that “[a]ll proposed regulations and rules” specified in an 
appendix accompanying the order were to be suspended for ninety 
days.144 He also directed that rules that had not yet been published in 
the state register should be withdrawn.145 Like other governors, he 
justified the freeze by claiming that it was necessary “to address the 
current economic and fiscal situation” and “to ensure that the 
regulatory processes of State Government do not have the effect of 
preventing this State from attracting new business enterprises, 
constraining the growth and expansion” of businesses, or “hindering 
the creation of jobs.”146 
Over the course of the following year, as the economy continued 
to suffer, several other newly elected governors followed New 
Jersey’s lead,147 implementing rule freezes in their own states in the 
name of boosting the economy and avoiding overregulation. For 
example, New Mexico’s governor, Susana Martinez, a Republican 
who had replaced a Democrat,148 signed an order on her first day in 
office on January 1, 2011, that suspended “[a]ll proposed and pending 
rules and regulations, excluding those not under the authority of the 
Governor,” for a period of ninety days, with limited, specified 
exceptions.149 Just days later in Maine, on January 10, 2011, right after 
 
 142. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.  
 143. David M. Halbfinger & Ian Urbina, G.O.P. Wins Two Key Governors’ Races; 
Bloomberg Prevails in a Close Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
11/04/nyregion/04elect.html. 
 144. Exec. Order No. 1 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/infobank/circular/
eocc1.pdf.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. See New Jersey: Common Sense Drives Regulatory Reform—A Positive Influence 
Outside Our Own State, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2011, at 17 (suggesting that 
“newly elected governors in Florida, Nevada, New Mexico and North Carolina have instituted 
rule freezes” inspired by New Jersey’s own freeze (quoting Kim Gaudagno, Lieutenant 
Governor of New Jersey)).  
 148. Marc Lacey, New Mexico Governor Rushes To Undo the Agenda of Her Predecessor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A11. 
 149. Exec. Order No. 2011-001 para. 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.governor.
state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf.  
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taking the governorship out of Democratic hands,150 the newly elected 
Republican governor, Paul LePage, issued an order, that put a six-
month halt on rulemaking in the state to enable his office to review 
proposed and pending rules, allowing rules to go forward during this 
period only if given the green light by his governor’s office.151 Also in 
January 2011, Tennessee’s governor, Bill Haslam, a Republican who 
had replaced a Democratic governor,152 issued a statement at the very 
beginning of his administration announcing “a 45-day freeze on any 
new regulations and rules as part of the top-to-bottom review of state 
government.”153  
One other state that saw a newly elected governor impose a brief 
rule freeze in 2011 was Florida. Specifically, in January 2011, 
immediately upon coming into office,154 Florida’s Republican 
governor, Rick Scott, stressed the need to avoid “duplicative, 
obsolete and unnecessarily burdensome requirements” on citizens 
 
 150. See Kevin Miller, Gov.-Elect LePage Takes Oath Today, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), 
Jan. 5, 2011, at 1 (noting that the Republican Governor LePage would succeed Democrat John 
Baldacci on January 5, 2011). 
 151. Exec. Order No. 09 (Me. Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whats
new/index.php?topic=Gov_Executive_Orders&id=182022&v=article2011. Notably, Governor 
LePage’s moratorium was immediately supplemented by an order issued by Maine’s secretary 
of state, who chose to implement “an immediate moratorium on rulemaking within the bureaus 
overseen by his office” and a review of existing and pending rules. Secretary of State Summers 
Implements Rulemaking Moratorium, Will Scrutinize Pending Rules, STATES NEWS SERVICE, 
Jan. 11, 2011, available at Academic OneFile, Doc. No. GALE|A246202209. Maine’s secretary 
of state is elected by the state’s legislature as a constitutional officer and is governed by the 
“Maine Constitution rather than by the Governor and Executive Department.” Id. Hence, the 
secretary of state felt that his supplemental order was necessary because the office of the 
secretary of state “is authorized under Maine’s Constitution and therefore theoretically outside 
of those impacted by the Governor’s Executive Order.” Id. (quoting Summers). 
 152. Gov. Bill Haslam (R), NAT’L J., http://www.nationaljournal.com/almanac/person/bill-
haslam-us (last updated July 1, 2011). 
 153. Press Release, Governor Bill Haslam, Haslam Announces Freeze of New Rules and 
Regulations (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://news.tennesseeanytime.org/node/6611. One high-
profile rule reportedly frozen by Governor Haslam’s order was a Tennessee Department of 
Revenue rule change that allegedly would have impacted online retailer Amazon.com. See 
Brian Reisinger, Retailers Call Play for Amazon ‘Unfair,’ NASHVILLE BUS. J., Apr. 1, 2011, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/print-edition/2011/04/01/retailers-call-play-for-amazon-
unfair.html (“The Department of Revenue canceled [a] hearing on the rule change, citing 
Haslam’s regulatory freeze as he came into office.”).  
 154. Ryan Mills, On the Job: Rick Scott Sworn In as Florida’s 45th Governor, Issues First 
Orders, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2011/
jan/04/rick-scott-sworn-in-florida-governor-inauguration. 
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and businesses by suspending rulemaking in the state.155 His order did 
not include a defined time period for the rulemaking suspension; 
nevertheless, a subsequent order issued by Governor Scott suggested 
that he had intended the suspension to last only temporarily while his 
administration worked to get a new Office of Fiscal Accountability 
and Regulatory Reform (OFARR) set up. Moving forward, OFARR 
would have to approve rulemaking by agencies under the governor’s 
direction before rules could move forward.156 
In short, as all of this executive activity demonstrates, numerous 
state governors have experimented with freezing regulatory activity 
for brief periods immediately upon coming into office, generally in 
the name of helping the economy and avoiding overregulation. This 
phenomenon suggests that at least some governors see soft moratoria 
as a means of aligning the regulatory machinery with their own policy 
goals. 
b. Hard Gubernatorial Moratoria.  Reliance upon executive-
driven moratoria in the states has not been limited to brief periods of 
political transition. To the contrary, some governors have ordered 
hard moratoria spanning one or more years—similar to President 
George H.W. Bush’s one-year moratorium on federal regulatory 
activity in 1992.157 Although North Carolina,158 Arizona,159 and perhaps 
Michigan160 all fall into this category, Nevada and Washington provide 
the clearest examples and are discussed here. 
 
 155. Exec. Order No. 11-01 (Fla. Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/
uploads/orders/2011/11-01-rulemaking.pdf, superseded by Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.  
 156. See Exec. Order No. 11-72 § 1 (requiring state agencies “to submit all proposed notices, 
along with the complete text of the proposed rule or amendment, to OFARR” and prohibiting 
agencies from publishing “any required notice without prior OFARR’s approval”). The Florida 
Supreme Court, however, later refused to read Executive Order No. 11-72 as overriding the 
suspension of rulemaking in the state. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804, at 
*10 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per curiam) (“We trust that any provision in Executive Order 11-72 
suspending agency compliance with the [Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 
120 (West 2008)], i.e., rulemaking, will not be enforced against an agency at this time . . . .”).  
 157. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.  
 159. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.  
 160. See Exec. Order No. 1995-6 § 4 (Mich. Mar. 31, 1995), available at http://www.state.mi.
us/migov/gov/ExecutiveOrders/1995/1995-6.html (ordering that agencies “shall process rules 
only when the rules are required by law, are necessary to interpret or enforce the law, are 
necessary to rescind or amend obsolete or superseded rules, or are necessary due to compelling 
public need”).  
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i. Washington.  In November 2010, Washington’s governor, 
Christine Gregoire, a Democrat who had assumed the governorship 
in 2005,161 ordered the suspension of all “non-critical rule 
development” by state agencies through January 1, 2012.162 In issuing 
the suspension, Governor Gregoire cited the need for a “stable and 
predictable regulatory and policy environment” in a time of “severe 
budget constraints” and the difficulty small businesses and 
governments face when “monitor[ing] and respond[ing] to proposed 
changes in rules and policies.”163 To try to help clear up ambiguity 
around which rules would be deemed critical and hence exempted 
from the suspension, Governor Gregoire’s office promptly issued a 
clarifying memorandum, stating that the “Governor is directing 
agencies to suspend rule making that is not immediately necessary.”164 
The memo also set forth certain categories of rules that would be 
deemed critical, such as rules required by federal or state law and 
rules “necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare or 
necessary to avoid an immediate threat to the state’s natural 
resources.”165 
Then, in the fall of 2011, Governor Gregoire issued another 
order, extending the initial moratorium through December 31, 
2012166—meaning that the moratorium was now scheduled to last 
more than two years. In extending the moratorium, Governor 
Gregoire explained that “[i]t’s clear from the state of our economy 
that the timing isn’t right to end the moratorium,” and that “[g]iving 
small businesses and local governments more time to devote their full 
attention to creating jobs and helping communities will help support 
the economy.”167 Hence, Washington’s moratorium is notable not only 
because it—unlike many other state-level moratoria—was issued by a 
 
 161. Chris McGann, Gregoire Sworn In amid Legal Challenge, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1. 
 162. Exec. Order No. 10-06 § 1 (Wash. Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.governor.wa
.gov/execorders/eo_10-06.pdf.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Memorandum from Kari Burrell, Exec. Policy Dir., to Agency Dirs. (Nov. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/20101116_memo_eo_10-06.pdf (emphasis added).  
 165. Id.  
 166. Exec. Order No. 11-03, at 1 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa
.gov/execorders/eo_11-03.pdf. 
 167. Press Release, Governor Chris Gregoire, Gov. Gregoire Extends Rule Moratorium 
(Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressRelease=
1784&newsType=1.  
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Democratic governor, but also because it was slated to last more than 
two years. 
ii. Nevada.  Turning to Nevada, Governor Brian Sandoval, a 
Republican who had taken over the governorship from a fellow 
Republican,168 issued a one-year freeze on proposed regulations, with 
specified exceptions, immediately upon coming into office in January 
2011.169 Although his order spoke of the need to review regulations to 
ensure that they were consistent with his regulatory policy,170 the one-
year freeze went well beyond a brief period of political change. The 
freeze was, for example, twice as long as the one ordered by 
Governor Schwarzenegger in California in 2003171 and four times as 
long as the freeze ordered by New Mexico’s governor in 2011.172 
Hence, Governor Sandoval’s freeze seems to be most properly 
classified not as a soft moratorium tied to a brief period of political 
transition but rather as a hard moratorium tied to relieving businesses 
of regulatory burdens, much like the moratorium President George 
H.W. Bush issued in 1992.173 Indeed, statements made by Governor 
Sandoval and his aides seemed to confirm that the moratorium was 
not simply about the political transition but rather was about the 
economy.174 
2. Calls for Hard Moratoria by State Legislatures.  In addition to 
the various moratoria imposed by state governors, state-level 
moratoria also have come about as a result of legislative action in at 
least two states: Arizona and North Carolina.175 Additionally, state 
 
 168. Ed Vogel, Sandoval Set To Take Office, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 1, 2011, at 2B. 
 169. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 para. 1 (Nev. Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://ndep.nv.gov/
docs_10/exec-order-2011-01.pdf.  
 170. See id. para. 2 (“The review shall include an assessment of how each regulation or set of 
regulations is consistent with my regulatory priorities—that is, to protect the health and welfare 
of the people of the state of Nevada without discouraging economic growth.”). 
 171. See Exec. Order No. S-2-03 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/
executive-order/3381 (ordering a 180-day regulatory freeze). 
 172. See Exec. Order No. 2011-001 para. 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf 
(ordering a ninety-day regulatory freeze). 
 173. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Ed Vogel, New Rules Don’t Violate Sandoval Order, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 12, 
2011, at 3B (“Sandoval made it clear the regulation freeze was meant strictly for regulations 
affecting business and that he wanted to help, not hurt, businesses.”).  
 175. Idaho stands in a different but somewhat related category. The Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5201 to -5292 (2006), requires legislative review of all 
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legislators in other states have proposed bills and nonbinding 
resolutions calling for moratoria. This Section describes this 
legislative activity. 
a. State Laws Imposing Moratoria.  The legislatures in both 
Arizona and North Carolina have experimented with imposing 
different kinds of regulatory moratoria. These legislatures, however, 
have not acted alone. Rather, they have acted in concert with the 
governors in those states. 
i. Arizona.  In Arizona, the state’s moratorium began when 
Governor Brewer came into office and ordered a regulatory 
moratorium on January 22, 2009, that initially was to last only 
through April 2009.176 She subsequently extended the moratorium, 
first through June 29, 2009,177 and then later through November 24, 
2009.178 In the midst of her actions, however, the legislature got 
involved, ultimately passing a law that extended the moratorium, first 
through June 2010,179 and then later through June 2011.180 In reporting 
 
proposed rules by a joint subcommittee, id. § 67-5223; see also OFFICE OF THE ADMIN. RULES 
COORDINATOR, THE IDAHO RULE WRITER’S MANUAL 13 (2010), available at http://admin
rules.idaho.gov/rulemaking_templates/rule_draftmanual.pdf. Analysts at the state’s Legislative 
Services Office, “who review and prepare an analysis of the proposed rules for the germane 
joint subcommittees, stop reviewing proposed rules and begin drafting legislation for the 
upcoming session” before the beginning of the legislative session. Id. Hence, “[p]rior to the 
beginning of the legislative session a m[o]ratorium is imposed on state agencies that restricts 
them from promulgating proposed rules.” Id.  
 176. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
 177. Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs. 
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/NR_043009_RegReviewDirective
.pdf; see also Jeremy Duda, Gov. Brewer Extends Suspension of Agency Rulemaking, ARIZ. 
CAP. TIMES, May 1, 2009, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/05/01/brewer-extends-suspension
-of-agency-rulemaking (“[Brewer] ordered a two-month extension of the ban on April 30. The 
new order keeps the suspension in effect until June 30. . . .”).  
 178. See Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting 
Dirs. (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Register/SDOC4287
Continuation02.pdf (extending the moratorium through October 16, 2009); Memorandum from 
Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs. (Oct. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.id.state.az.us/publications/Gov_Regulatory_Review_Plan_Oct_16_2009.pdf 
(extending the moratorium through November 24, 2009). 
 179. See Act of Sept. 4, 2009, ch. 7, § 28(A), 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1874, 1905 (imposing a 
regulatory moratorium through the 2009–2010 fiscal year); ARIZONA OPENBOOKS, http://open
books.az.gov/app/transparency/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (“The State of Arizona 
government operates on a fiscal year that begins on July 1 and ends on the following June 30.”).  
 180. Act of May 10, 2010, ch. 287, sec. 18, § 28(A), 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1804, 1829–30. A 
gap in coverage existed between the two bills, with the original legislative moratorium set to 
expire at the end of June 2010, and the second legislative moratorium not set to kick in until 
WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  1:22 AM 
1916 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1883 
on the legislature’s embrace of the moratorium, one newspaper in 
Arizona somewhat wryly noted, “Legislatures have enacted state 
holidays. They’ve done tax holidays. Now, Arizona’s Legislature 
wants a regulatory holiday—an extended holiday.”181 
Although the legislatively imposed moratorium was set to expire 
at the end of June 2011,182 Governor Brewer stepped back in on June 
30, 2011, with yet another order to executive state agencies—this time 
calling for the moratorium to continue through June 30, 2012.183 In 
extending the moratorium once again, Governor Brewer noted that 
“the economic climate in Arizona continues to challenge both those 
seeking employment and our employers,” that “a predictable 
regulatory climate in this State will promote job creation and 
retention,” and that “the expiration of the current regulatory review 
and moratorium could result in a regulatory explosion detrimental to 
job creation and retention in this State.”184 Notably, she also pointed 
to the actions of other states as support for the moratorium, reporting 
that from the time she had called for the moratorium in 2009, “other 
states ha[d] since implemented regulatory reviews and 
moratoriums.”185 
ii. North Carolina. North Carolina has also experienced an 
interesting mix of legislative and executive action regarding 
regulatory moratoria. In October 2010, North Carolina’s governor, 
Beverly Perdue, a Democrat who had taken office in 2009,186 issued an 
executive order commanding her cabinet secretaries to refrain from 
creating any new rules until the order was rescinded unless the rules 
were “deemed necessary to serve the public interest” or were 
required by law.187 Although the command might have been read to 
 
July 29, 2010. Exec. Order No. 2010-13 (Ariz. June 30, 2010), available at http://azgovernor.gov/
dms/upload/EO_2010-13.pdf. Hence, Governor Brewer filled the gap, issuing an executive order 
that extended the moratorium from July 1, 2010, through July 29, 2010. Id. 
 181. Mary Jo Pitzl, Freeze on New Laws, Rules Sought, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2009, at 1.  
 182. Act of May 10, 2010, sec. 18, § 28(A), 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 1829–30. 
 183. Exec. Order No. 2011-05 (Ariz. June 30, 2011), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/diro/
admin_rules/documents/Governor-Executive-Order_2011-05.pdf. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Press Release, Office of Governor Bev Perdue, Perdue Inaugurated as 73rd Governor, 
Pledges Strong, Hands-on Leadership in Tough Times (Jan. 10, 2009), available at http://www.
governor.state.nc.us/newsItems/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?newsItemID=13. 
 187. Exec. Order No. 2011-001 § 2(1)(a) (N.C. Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.
governor.state.nc.us/NewsItems/UploadedFiles/88069e35-fa4c-4d03-b785-6455d7dc8880.pdf.  
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lack teeth, given that the word “necessary” could be read liberally to 
allow most if not all otherwise-authorized rules to proceed,188 
Governor Perdue simultaneously issued a press release that 
demonstrated that she meant the word “necessary” to be read 
stringently.189 The press release began by noting, “Governor Perdue 
today issued a directive to her cabinet secretaries and a request of 
Council of State members: do not create any new rules unless they 
are absolutely necessary.”190 
After Governor Perdue had issued her ban on noncritical rules, 
the state legislature became involved, passing a law in March 2011 
that barred agencies from adopting rules that would result in 
“substantial estimated additional costs”—defined as an aggregate 
financial impact on all persons subject to the rule of at least $500,000 
in a twelve-month period—unless adoption of the rule fell within a 
specified exception, such as being necessary to respond to “a serious 
and unforeseen threat to the public health, safety, or welfare,” or to a 
law or court order.191 The law was reportedly designed to “prohibit 
new regulations that would hit North Carolinians in the 
pocketbook,”192 or as one newspaper put it, to freeze “new rules if 
 
 188. For example, at the federal level, Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), 
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp. 
IV 2010), which was initially adopted by President Clinton, seems to ban regulations that are 
not necessary, providing,  
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are 
necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such 
as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of 
the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. 
Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (emphasis 
added). This text, however, appears in a section of the executive order titled “Statement of 
Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” id., and it could be read to set more of an aspirational 
regulatory philosophy for agencies than a stringent requirement. Indeed, President Clinton 
surely did not view this language as imposing the equivalent of a moratorium, given that he 
openly opposed the concept of a regulatory moratorium. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 416 
(asserting in 1995 that “the blunt instrument of a moratorium” was not “the right way to reform 
regulation”). 
 189. Press Release, Office of Governor Bev Perdue, Governor Stops New Rulemaking 
Unless Absolutely Necessary (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.governor.nc.gov/News
Items/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?newsItemID=1524.  
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, Sess. L. No. 2011-13, 2011 N.C. ALS 13 (LEXIS).  
 192. David N. Bass, GOP Clashes with Perdue over Regulatory Reform Agenda, CAROLINA 
J. ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=
7378. 
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they [would] cost the regulated target money.”193 The lifespan of this 
rulemaking freeze on significant rules proved fleeting, however, 
because in July 2011, the legislature enacted—over Governor 
Perdue’s veto—a new law that repealed the prior law.194 The new law 
included a host of wide-ranging provisions relating to regulatory 
reform, including a provision that barred state agencies from adopting 
rules unless they were are “necessary to serve the public interest.”195 
This new requirement did not go into effect until October 2011,196 so it 
is still too soon to know whether the term “necessary” will be read 
loosely or stringently in North Carolina. 
b. State Bills and Resolutions Proposing Moratoria.  In 2011 
alone,197 bills or resolutions involving proposed moratoria were 
introduced in states such as Connecticut,198 Michigan,199 Oregon,200 
Washington,201 and West Virginia.202 Some of these unenacted bills 
proposed a freeze on regulatory activity within the state, whereas 
others were merely nonbinding resolutions encouraging the federal 
government to impose a moratorium on federal rulemaking. 
 
 193. Lynn Bonner & Rob Christensen, Senators Call for Freeze of Rule Making, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 9, 2011, at B3. 
 194. Act of July 25, 2011, Sess. Law No. 2011-398, § 61.2, 2011 N.C. ALS 398 (LEXIS).  
 195. Id. § 2. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Although 2011 seems to have been a particularly busy year for moratoria proposals, 
state legislatures have considered such proposals in prior years as well. For example, in 1993, 
New York’s senate passed a bill called the Regulatory Relief Act of 1993, S. 3659, 190th Leg., 
216th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993), which would have established a 120-day moratorium on the 
issuance of proposed or final rules with specified exceptions, id.; see also JAMES W. WRIGHT, 
1993 REPORT OF THE SENATE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REVIEW 
COMMISSION 23–24 (1993) (noting that S. 3659, the Regulatory Relief Act of 1993, passed the 
senate in New York).  
 198. See S. 390, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (proposing “[t]o establish a two-year 
moratorium on new state regulations”).  
 199. See S. Res. 27, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (urging the president “to impose a 
moratorium on any new regulations”).  
 200. See S.B. 812, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2011) (proposing a rule 
moratorium); S.B. 712, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2011) (same).  
 201. See H.R. 1156, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2011) (proposing to suspend agency 
rulemaking until the “later of July 1, 2014, or such time as the economic and revenue forecast 
council reports for three consecutive quarters that state revenue collections have increased 
above the official forecast”). 
 202. Quality Control Procedure for Agency Rules Act, S.B. 517, 80th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(W. Va. 2011) (proposing a “five-year moratorium on the adoption of new agency rules and 
modification of existing rules” but excepting “new emergency rules or modifications or new 
rules or modifications required by federal or state law”).  
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For example, in Michigan, the state senate passed a resolution in 
March 2011 that, among other things, urged “the President of the 
United States to impose a moratorium on any new [federal] 
regulations.”203 The resolution specifically found that 
“[n]onproductive and burdensome regulations take a major toll on 
the job-creating capacity of companies of all sizes and types” and that 
“[t]he total cost of complying with all federal regulations has been 
estimated to be as high as more than $1 trillion, which amounts to 
$10,500 each year for every person employed by a small business.”204 
In contrast, Republican senators in Oregon introduced bills that 
were aimed at freezing state regulatory activity, claiming that a 
regulatory suspension was needed to “spur job creation across the 
state” and to reduce burdens facing businesses.205 The Oregon leaders 
pointed to Arizona and Washington, noting, “In December, 
Washington Governor Chris Gregoire (D) issued an executive order 
suspending the development of all new agency rules,” and “Arizona 
Governor Jan Brewer (R) enacted a similar order in 2009.”206 
Evidently, news of state-level regulatory moratoria travels among 
various governmental actors,207 likely helping to fuel regulatory 
moratoria’s emergence at the state level. 
II. ASSESSING THE PROPRIETY AND LEGALITY OF MORATORIA 
Both hard and soft moratoria have worked their way into the 
political toolbox at the federal and state levels thanks to legislative 
and executive action. The emergence of regulatory moratoria, 
however, invites the question whether moratoria are sound from both 
a legal and policy perspective. 
This Part seeks to identify and assess the major legal and policy 
arguments in favor of and against soft and hard regulatory moratoria. 
 
 203. S. Res. 27, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, Republicans Call for Moratorium on Agency 
Rulemaking (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/press_releases/sro_012011
.pdf; see also Michelle Cole, GOP Seeks Two-Year Halt to New State Agency Rules, 
OREGONIAN, Jan. 21, 2011, available at NewsBank, Doc No. MERLIN_16457724 (describing 
Oregon Republicans’ demand for a regulatory moratorium).  
 206. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, supra note 205.  
 207. See Johanna Maurice, The Future Belongs to the Nimble, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. 
Va.), July 9, 2011, at 5A (noting “[w]eird things” happening in other states, such as how “[i]n 
Florida, Nevada, New Mexico and Tennessee, new Republican governors [had] issued executive 
orders putting freezes on new state regulations”).  
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This Part concludes that hard moratoria carry minimal benefits and 
significant costs. As a result, it warns against the use of hard 
moratoria—such as those implemented by President George H.W. 
Bush in 1992 and those implemented at the state level in Arizona, 
Nevada, and Washington. Nevertheless, this Part also concludes that 
soft moratoria—such as those used by Presidents Reagan, Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Obama upon coming into office—might well 
play an appropriate role when used carefully by the executive branch 
following a change in administration so as to further democratic 
accountability. 
A. Hard Moratoria: An Improper and Ill-Advised Tool 
Hard moratoria are often justified on the grounds that they will 
reduce costs and regulatory burdens, increase regulatory 
predictability, and address Americans’ concerns about 
overregulation. At the same time, however, hard moratoria raise 
numerous risks, including a lack of transparency, protracted 
regulatory confusion, legal challenges, harm to the public interest, 
and blunt antiregulatory bias. Hence, balancing the costs and benefits 
of regulatory moratoria reveals that the willingness of states such as 
Arizona, Nevada, and Washington to impose hard moratoria should 
not be replicated elsewhere. 
1. The Asserted Benefits of Hard Regulatory Moratoria.  
Proponents of hard moratoria either implicitly or explicitly articulate 
three major arguments in favor of hard moratoria: (1) the avoidance 
of costly, burdensome, or unnecessary regulations to achieve cost 
savings; (2) the creation of a stable and consistent regulatory 
environment; and (3) political symbolism. 
a. Achieving Cost Savings.  The most pervasive argument made 
in favor of hard moratoria—whether imposed by the executive or by 
the legislative branch—has to do with the desire to achieve cost 
savings during tough economic times by avoiding costly, burdensome, 
or unnecessary regulations. For example, in announcing Washington’s 
moratorium in 2010, Governor Gregoire noted the need to “conserve 
resources” in the face of a weak economy.208  
 
 208. See Exec. Order No. 10-06, at 1 (Wash. Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.
governor.wa.gov/execorders/eo_10-06.pdf (“[W]e are called upon in these unprecedented 
economic times to both conserve resources and continue to meet our responsibilities . . . .”).  
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The implication of these sorts of statements seems to be that by 
freezing rules, moratoria will reduce costs, conserve resources, and 
avoid unnecessary and burdensome regulation. Nevertheless, the 
reality is that—due in no small part to the general lack of scholarly 
attention paid to regulatory moratoria—very little is known about 
whether these assertions about cost savings are true. In 1992, for 
example, President George H.W. Bush claimed that the reforms that 
he had set into motion during the first three months of his 
administration would “save consumers about $15 billion to $20 billion 
a year”—a savings of “$225 to $300 per year for the average 
American family.”209 Yet his administration refused—despite public-
records requests—to provide data to back up these claims,210 and one 
scholar—Professor Scott Furlong—has concluded that the Bush 
“moratorium had a minimal impact on regulatory output,”211 thus 
undermining President Bush’s claims. 
Moreover, even if one could prove—contrary to Professor 
Furlong’s findings—that moratoria do lead to lower regulatory 
output, this showing would say “nothing about the actual impact of 
not promulgating certain regulations.”212 For example, Governor 
Gregoire claimed that agencies in Washington had “put 436 rules—
about half of what was proposed—on hold” in the first year of the 
state’s moratorium.213 But merely considering the number of rules put 
on hold in Washington does not give a full picture of the impact of 
not promulgating the regulations. This is because regulations are 
developed to try to bring benefits to society, including “cleaner air 
and water, safer products, a sounder banking system.”214 Therefore, 
when regulations are not promulgated, any benefit to those who seek 
to avoid regulation may well be offset by harm to society at large, 
such as harm to the environment or to public health. The benefits that 
flow from rules may be quite significant and hence should form part 
of the calculus when one considers the cost savings of moratoria. 
Indeed, especially at the federal level, that the benefits of most rules 
outweigh the costs seems quite likely, given the centralized review 
 
 209. Bush, supra note 51, at 664. 
 210. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii–iii (“The administration refused [public 
records requests] on grounds of ‘executive privilege.’”).  
 211. Furlong, supra note 14, at 260–61.  
 212. Id. at 257.  
 213. Press Release, Governor Chris Gregoire, supra note 167. 
 214. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at 23. 
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process run by OIRA and the fairly robust opportunities for judicial 
review of rules. 
Although one’s initial instinct might be to think that fewer rules 
mean lower enactment and enforcement costs to the government, as 
well as lower compliance costs to those regulated, the evidence about 
potential costs savings is not well developed. Until more evidence is 
collected, unproven claims that moratoria will yield cost savings and 
conserve resources seem an insufficient basis for imposing something 
as blunt as a freeze on rulemaking—especially when numerous other 
tools already exist to ensure sound and responsible rulemaking, such 
as cost-benefit analysis, public participation in the rulemaking 
process, legislative control of statutory delegations to agencies, and 
judicial review.215 
b. Creating a Stable Regulatory Environment.  Another major 
argument commonly made in favor of hard moratoria is the 
desirability of creating regulatory stability. For example, in ordering 
Nevada’s moratorium, Governor Sandoval asserted that “stable, 
consistent and predictable common sense regulation is vital to 
maintaining a regulatory environment that both secures the people 
and businesses of the state of Nevada and fosters economic 
growth.”216 Similarly, in arguing in favor of a federal moratorium, 
Senator Susan Collins of Maine analogized to sports time-outs, noting 
that time-outs are taken to “give athletes a chance to catch their 
breaths and make better decisions about the next play.”217 According 
to Senator Collins, “American workers and businesses are the 
athletes in a global competition,” and “[t]hey need a time-out from 
excessive regulation so that America can get back to work.”218 
These sorts of repeated claims that regulatory moratoria will lead 
to greater regulatory certainty and will give businesses a “time-out,” 
however, seem oversimplified. For one thing, as Professor Jonathan 
Adler points out in responding to Senator Collins’s claims, “Kicking 
the regulatory can down the road does not reduce uncertainty, nor 
does it improve the investment climate.”219 Rather, pushing regulation 
 
 215. Cf. supra note 1. 
 216. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, at 1 (Nev. Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://ndep.nv.gov/docs_
10/exec-order-2011-01.pdf.  
 217. Susan Collins, Opinion, The Economy Needs a Regulation Time-Out, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
26, 2011, at A15.  
 218. Id. 
 219. Adler, supra note 15. 
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down the line is likely to create more uncertainty about the future 
and to place a strain on industry planning cycles.220 
Furthermore, a long-term moratorium freezing agencies out of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking might prod agencies to try to clear 
up regulatory uncertainty via other less desirable means. For 
example, agencies might promulgate policy via case-by-case 
adjudication if the agency has adjudicatory authority.221 Or if the 
moratorium could be read to apply only to notice-and-comment 
rules,222 then the agency might turn toward issuing more informal 
guidance documents, general policy statements, and interpretive 
rules,223 which are generally exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements.224 These alternative methods of promulgating policy 
generally lack the same opportunities for political review, 
transparency, and public participation as those that are built into the 
normal notice-and-comment rulemaking process,225 and this 
 
 220. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii (arguing that a “rule freeze, in fact, can 
harm the economy since businesses face uncertainty about what standards they must comply 
with” and since “delaying implementation of regulations” can “place[] a strain on the capital 
planning cycles of industry”); cf. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, STATE OF WASH., RULEMAKING 
SUSPENSION UPDATE 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/docs/decision_
list.pdf (noting that a rulemaking involving outdoor burning could be delayed until 2012 under 
Washington’s rulemaking suspension but acknowledging that waiting until 2012 would “delay 
improvements in rule clarity and streamlining that benefit those businesses and residents who 
may be subject to the regulations”).  
 221. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the 
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 222. See, e.g., Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(proposing a two-year regulatory freeze but exempting from the freeze all regulations that are 
exempted from the notice requirements of section 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006)).  
 223. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 220, at 1, 2 (noting that the Department of 
Ecology would delay a rulemaking related to reclaimed water pursuant to Governor Gregoire’s 
rulemaking suspension and that “Ecology can use the delay to focus on developing guidance 
about reclaimed water that answers concerns raised by stakeholders” (emphasis added)).  
 224. See, e.g., APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (exempting “interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice” from notice-and-
comment requirements under the federal APA).  
 225. See Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed 
Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 338 (2007) (noting that 
“guidance documents, case-by-case administrative adjudication, or other informal 
mechanisms . . . lack the transparency or democratic legitimacy of the rulemaking process”); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546 (2002) (describing how “[m]aking policy through 
adjudication can lead to inconsistent outcomes and frustrates expectations when policy changes 
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circumvention of notice-and-comment rulemaking would hence 
undermine good governance. 
c. Furthering Political Symbolism.  Finally, from the perspective 
of politicians who support regulatory moratoria, a third benefit of 
hard moratoria might have to do with popular discourse and political 
symbolism. By supporting regulatory moratoria, politicians are able 
to issue press releases, appear on television, and author editorials in 
the name of standing up against overregulation and listening to 
constituents’ concerns. Although supporters of regulatory moratoria 
generally do not forthrightly state that they are proposing moratoria 
to be responsive to constituents’ concerns, many of their actions and 
comments suggest that those concerns are indeed at play. 
Americans’ concerns in 1992 about the ailing economy and 
overregulation, for example, seem to have motivated President 
George H.W. Bush to issue his one-year moratorium in the midst of 
his presidential campaign.226 President Bush chose to announce during 
his acceptance speech before the Republican National Convention in 
the summer of 1992 that he would be extending his moratorium, 
leading to the perception among some that the moratorium was 
nothing more than an “election-year gambit.”227 Indeed, even his aides 
referred to “new polls showing public distaste” for regulation when 
explaining President Bush’s motivations in imposing the freeze.228  
In addition, the spurt of bills proposed in Congress in 2011 
calling for a regulatory moratorium seem linked to polls showing a 
distaste for overregulation. Most notably, a poll released by Gallup in 
October 2011 showed that “[s]mall business owners in the United 
States are most likely to say complying with government regulations 
(22%) is the most important problem facing them today, followed by 
consumer confidence in the economy (15%) and lack of consumer 
 
retroactively”); cf. APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting these alternative policy 
instruments from the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 226. See Furlong, supra note 14, at 261 (“Symbolically, the moratorium showed a president 
responding to an economic crisis as well as catering to conservative voters.”).  
 227. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at i.  
 228. Jehl, supra note 46; see also Corporate Executives Surveyed Say Government 
Regulations Top Concern, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 207, 208 (1992) (reporting that in a survey of 
653 corporate executives during the second half of 1991, government regulation was identified 
as the top concern for more than 50 percent of all chief executive officers).  
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demand (12%).”229 In addition, whereas Gallup polls indicated that 
only 36 percent of Americans in 2006 and 38 percent in 2007 and 2008 
had said that there was “too much” government regulation of 
business and industry, the percentage spiked to 50 percent of 
Americans by September 2011—a result that was “by one percentage 
point the highest in Gallup’s [then-nineteen-year] history” of asking 
the question.230 Notably, 84 percent of Republicans—compared to 
only 22 percent of Democrats—polled in September 2011 answered 
this question by saying that there was “too much government 
regulation of business and industry” whereas just 56 percent of 
Republicans—compared with 23 percent of Democrats—polled in 
2008 had answered the question by saying that there was “too much” 
government regulation.231 
Various Republican members of Congress appear to have paid 
careful attention to these polls. For instance, in introducing the 
Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011,232 one Republican member of the 
House justified the need for a regulatory moratorium by noting that 
“[s]mall businesses tell us that their top challenge is complying with 
government regulations.”233 Similarly, when Senator Susan Collins 
introduced the same act in the Senate,234 she signaled that she was 
paying close attention to public opinion. Specifically, in a televised 
interview with CNBC, she explained that she had come up with the 
idea for proposing a regulatory “time-out” after “talking to 
employers in [her] state [who] kept telling [her] they were dreading 
what was coming out of Washington next by way of regulation.”235 She 
also tried to speak directly to American workers and businesses when 
 
 229. Dennis Jacobe, Gov’t Regulations at Top of Small-Business Owners’ Problem List, 
GALLUP (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150287/gov-regulations-top-small-business-
owners-problem-list.aspx.  
 230. Frank Newport, Despite Negativity, Americans Mixed on Ideal Role of Gov’t, GALLUP 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149741/despite-negativity-americans-mixed-ideal-
role-gov.aspx.  
 231. See id. (noting that “Republicans have consistently been more likely than Democrats to 
say there is too much government regulation of business” but that “in recent years, the gap 
between Republican and Democratic views on this issue has widened”).  
 232. Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 233. Press Release, U.S. Rep. Richard Hanna, Hanna Introduces Legislation To Put a Time-
Out on Regulations (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://hanna.house.gov/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=3157:hanna-introduces-legislation-to-put-a-time-out-on-regulations&
catid=49:press&Itemid=300066.  
 234. Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 235. The Kudlow Report (CNBC television program Sept. 26, 2011), available at http://
video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000047845. 
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she published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal arguing in favor of a 
moratorium in which she asserted, “I have asked employers in my 
state what it would take to help them add jobs. No matter their 
business or the size of their work force, they tell me that Washington 
must stop imposing crushing new regulations.”236  
In addition, when Republicans in the Oregon State Senate called 
for a two-year suspension of rulemaking in 2011 to spur job creation 
across the state, they pointed out that “[s]mall businesses routinely 
point to the bureaucratic morass of state government rules and 
regulations as a key barrier to job creation.”237 Likewise, in 
Washington, the Department of Ecology’s deputy director noted that 
Governor Gregoire’s decision to suspend noncritical rulemaking “is 
responsive to what she is hearing from the broader regulated 
community,” which is “telling her they are struggling in this difficult 
economic climate to meet current regulations—not only 
environmental regulations, but others as well—and that a time-out on 
new rules is something government can do to help.”238 
Hence, from the perspective of politicians, a major advantage of 
a regulatory moratorium does seem to be its political symbolism, 
enabling politicians to show Americans that their concerns about 
overregulation have been registered and heard. Indeed, the number 
of unenacted regulatory-moratoria bills proposed in the 112th 
Congress239 suggests that politicians believe that they may well gain 
this political benefit simply by touting that they have proposed a 
moratorium—regardless of whether the moratorium is ever actually 
implemented. 
Political representation and political responsiveness is, of course, 
a central component of American democracy and is generally to be 
applauded. If, for example, residents who live downwind from a plant 
ask for increased regulation of pollutants from the plant, the 
governor’s touting such complaints as a justification for more 
regulation of the plant would be perfectly appropriate. On the one 
hand, the fact that politicians’ proposals for regulatory moratoria seek 
to respond to constituents’ concerns about overregulation could be 
 
 236. Collins, supra note 217.  
 237. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, supra note 205. 
 238. Letter from Polly Zehm, Deputy Dir., Dep’t of Ecology, State of Wash., to Ecology 
Stakeholders (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/docs/zehmletter_
111710.html.  
 239. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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viewed positively as a sign of political responsiveness in a democratic 
system. On the other hand, concerns about overregulation may suffer 
from a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem. Specifically, whether 
politicians’ own statements about the pitfalls of regulation have 
created an antiregulatory fever, and hence whether the politicians are 
actually the ones who have created the public opinion leaning against 
regulatory action, is hard to know. In other words, politicians’ own 
public statements condemning regulation may have helped to create 
and feed the public climate. 
2. The Costs of Hard Regulatory Moratoria.  Even if hard 
moratoria can be said to appropriately help ensure political 
responsiveness to legitimate public opinion, this political benefit must 
be weighed against the costs of moratoria. Hard moratoria carry with 
them many significant potential costs. First, as demonstrated by a 
2011 Florida Supreme Court opinion,240 executive-driven regulatory 
moratoria raise thorny legal questions, including separation-of-
powers concerns about whether the executive possesses the legal 
authority to suspend rulemaking. In addition, both legislative- and 
executive-driven moratoria threaten to undermine transparency, 
create protracted regulatory confusion, and evince a blunt 
antiregulatory bias that simply assumes that the status quo is better 
than what the current administration would produce for the future. 
These aspects of hard moratoria suggest that the costs of hard 
moratoria significantly outweigh any political or symbolic benefits, 
leading to the conclusion that hard moratoria are an ill-advised tool 
for political control and should be avoided. 
a. Imposing the Costs of Legal Challenges.  One of the most 
significant risks of executive-driven moratoria is their likelihood to 
invite legal battles. In the wake of President George H.W. Bush’s 
1992 moratoria, for example, a number of cases were filed challenging 
agencies’ delays of rules.241 These cases raised a variety of questions 
pertaining to specific rules, such as whether certain rules were 
 
 240. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804, at *1 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per 
curiam) (addressing the legality of the Florida governor’s decision to suspend rulemaking in the 
state).  
 241. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at 18–22 (describing litigation challenging 
agency delays).  
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required by statutory deadlines or statutory requirements.242 If they 
were, President Bush lacked the authority to suspend them. 
Even more threatening than the potential for as-applied claims 
asserting that specific rules must be exempt from a hard moratorium, 
however, is the possibility that broader constitutional issues—most 
notably, separation-of-powers issues—could be raised challenging the 
facial validity of the chief executive’s order. At the federal level, 
“[m]ost regulatory statutes specify that agency heads, rather than the 
president, shall make regulatory decisions.”243 In the states, many, if 
not most, regulatory statutes delegate rulemaking authority to agency 
heads, not to state governors.244 Those desiring to challenge executive-
driven hard moratoria might well question whether the chief 
executive has the power—consistent with notions of the separation of 
powers and existing statutory schemes—to suspend discretionary 
rulemaking activities that the legislature chose to delegate to agency 
heads, not to the chief executive.245 The answer to this question is not 
straightforward, and it likely varies at the federal and state levels due 
to the differing separation-of-powers principles and different 
constitutional and statutory provisions at play in different 
jurisdictions.246 
At least at the federal level, a robust body of literature erupted 
after President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which called 
for OMB review of all major rules.247 Specifically, scholars questioned 
whether the president had the legal authority to direct centralized 
executive review of regulatory activity in light of Congress’s general 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over 
Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2487 (2011); see also Kevin M. 
Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 550–52 (2005) (discussing presidential 
directive authority). 
 244. See, e.g., Whiley, 2011 WL 3568804, at *5 (noting that in Florida, the “Legislature has 
delegated specific responsibility to agency heads, such as the authority to determine whether to 
go forward with proposing, amending, repealing or adopting rules”); see also New Energy 
Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 291 (N.M. 2011) (concluding that the state legislature had 
delegated duties to state agencies independent of the governor).  
 245. A legislatively imposed hard moratorium, of course, would not raise similar separation-
of-powers concerns because the legislature itself would be suspending rulemaking activity that it 
had created in the first instance.  
 246. Cf. Carl T. Bogus, The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 77, 80 (2004) (noting that the states differ as to how they approach separation-of-powers 
issues and “as to what extent they seek equipoise among the branches”).  
 247. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 §§ 6–7, 3 C.F.R. 127, 131–33 (1982) (granting broad review 
powers to a task force within OMB). 
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decision to delegate rulemaking power via statute to particular 
agencies, not to the president.248 At least three principal approaches to 
the question of presidential directive authority have emerged as this 
general debate over presidential authority to direct regulatory 
decisions has continued. The first approach—the unitary-executive 
approach—“holds that presidential directive authority is 
constitutionally required.”249 The unitary-executive theory flows from 
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests the 
executive power in “a President of the United States.”250 Pursuant to 
the unitary-executive theory, “executive officers can act only in the 
President’s stead, since it is the President and the President alone who 
can delegate to them the constitutional power that they must have if 
they are to execute laws.”251 In other words, notwithstanding any 
statutory language that might vest a particular power, such as 
discretionary rulemaking authority, in a particular agency, “it is the 
President, under our Constitution, who must always be the ultimate 
empowered and responsible actor.”252 
The second approach—the “‘directive authority’ as an 
‘interpretive principle’” approach—takes the position that “statutes 
entrusting regulatory decisions to [executive] agency heads should be 
interpreted to grant the President directive authority unless they 
expressly restrict it.”253 This approach, which has been articulated by 
then-Professor Kagan, rejects unitary-executive advocates’ claims 
 
 248. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in 
Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988) (discussing “the 
constitutional controversies surrounding Executive Order 12,291 and the promise of similar 
disputes over Executive Order 12,498” but concluding that “[w]hatever one’s opinion of the 
policy prescriptions contained in President Reagan’s executive orders, the actions taken therein 
fall squarely within the president’s constitutional authority”); Colin S. Diver, Commentary, 
Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 526–27 (1987) (“[N]umerous critics have charged 
that, as actually implemented, the executive orders constitute a distortion of the President’s 
supervisory role.”); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Analysis of Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1199 (1981) (“[T]he question . . . is whether the President in promulgating Executive order 
12,291 has engaged in an exercise of Executive lawmaking without either constitutional or 
statutory authority and thereby violated the separation of powers doctrine.”); Peter M. Shane, 
Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of 
Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235 (1981) (exploring “the [fundamental] 
threshold question of the order’s facial legality”). 
 249. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488 (summarizing the unitary-executive theory).  
 250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
 251. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 20, at 595.  
 252. Id. at 595–96. 
 253. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488.  
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“for plenary [executive] control as a matter of constitutional 
mandate.”254 Instead, then-Professor Kagan views the question as one 
of congressional intent, arguing that “if Congress, as it usually does, 
simply has assigned discretionary authority to an agency official 
without in any way commenting on the President’s role in the 
delegation,” then a way to read such a statute—at least when 
executive as opposed to independent agencies are involved—would 
be to “assume that the delegation runs to the agency official specified, 
rather than to any other agency official, but still subject to the 
ultimate control of the President.”255 
Under the third approach, “the President does not have directive 
authority unless a statute expressly gives it to him.”256 According to 
this approach, “as a matter of statutory construction the President has 
directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under the statute 
or to bind the discretion of lower level officials—only when the 
statute expressly grants power to the President in name.”257 
Although the extensive scholarly debate has yielded little 
consensus as to which of these approaches to presidential powers is 
correct, the reality is that centralized executive review and oversight 
of the regulatory process of the type initiated by President Reagan in 
Executive Order 12,291258 has become an “entrenched” and 
established element of the administrative process.259 Yet an across-
the-board, long-term freeze on rulemaking ordered by a president 
differs significantly from what is now viewed as entrenched 
centralized presidential oversight, and hence—depending on which 
approach to presidential power were to be applied—such a blanket 
freeze could be seen as pushing the envelope too far and as violating 
separation-of-powers principles. 
On the one hand, for those who adhere to the unitary-executive 
theory, the executive would possess ample authority to freeze 
discretionary rulemaking because the president alone has the power 
to execute federal law.260 In contrast, those who argue that the 
president can oversee regulatory activity but cannot generally dictate 
 
 254. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2326.  
 255. Id. at 2326–27.  
 256. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488.  
 257. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 263, 267 (2006).  
 258. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
 259. Beermann, supra note 1, at 65 n.20.  
 260. Cf. supra notes 249–52. 
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or decide substantive questions delegated to agencies by Congress 
might argue that a long-term rulemaking ban ordered by the 
president impermissibly decides the substance of regulatory questions 
delegated to agencies by favoring the status quo.261 
A case decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 2011 suggests 
that the risk of an executive-driven hard moratorium’s triggering such 
constitutional questions in certain jurisdictions is very real. The case, 
Whiley v. Scott,262 involved a challenge to two executive orders issued 
by Florida’s newly elected governor, Rick Scott, in 2011,263 and hence 
the case turned on specific aspects of Florida law. The first order 
challenged was Executive Order No. 11-01,264 which had suspended 
agency rulemaking in the state and also had established OFARR 
within the governor’s office.265 The second order challenged was 
Executive Order No. 11-72,266 which had superseded Executive Order 
No. 11-01 and had allowed agencies to move forward with rulemaking 
in the state only after seeking the approval of OFARR.267 The woman 
challenging the orders, Rosalie Whiley, was a blind woman who 
claimed standing as a Florida citizen and taxpayer and initially 
asserted that Executive Order 11-01 negatively impacted her as a 
blind food-stamp recipient by delaying a rule that would have made 
completing an online application for benefits easier.268 
In bringing suit, Whiley sought a writ of quo warranto from the 
court, arguing that the governor had exceeded his authority and 
violated separation-of-powers principles.269 In agreeing to exercise its 
discretion to hear the case, the Florida Supreme Court noted that a 
decision from it could “provide important guiding principles to other 
 
 261. Cf. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001) (“[A]lthough the president’s ability to 
remove agency heads gives him enormous power to influence their decisions, it does not give 
him the authority to dictate substantive decisions entrusted to them by law.”); Strauss, supra 
note 20, at 704–05 (arguing that the president can act as “overseer” but not “decider”).  
 262. Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per curiam). 
 263. Id. at *1. 
 264. Exec. Order No. 11-01 (Fla. Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/
orders/2011/11-01-rulemaking.pdf, superseded by Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.  
 265. Id. §§ 1, 3. 
 266. Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.  
 267. Id. § 1. 
 268. Whiley, 2011 WL 3568804, at *2 n.4. 
 269. Id. at *2. 
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state courts.”270 Then, turning to the merits, the court, over the dissent 
of two justices, sided with Whiley, concluding, “[T]he Governor’s 
executive orders at issue here, to the extent each suspends and 
terminates rulemaking . . . absent prior approval from OFARR—
contrary to the [Florida] Administrative Procedure Act—infringe 
upon the very process of rulemaking and encroach upon the 
Legislature’s delegation of its rulemaking power.”271 
The court noted that in Florida, rulemaking is seen as a 
legislative function and that the “Legislature retains the sole right to 
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies.”272 The Florida Supreme 
Court, accordingly, found that the governor’s orders “that operate[d] 
to suspend rulemaking . . . constitute[d] an encroachment upon a 
legislative function.”273 
Because the Whiley case turned on specific aspects of the Florida 
constitution and Florida statutory provisions, its direct application is 
limited to Florida. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court’s separation-
of-powers analysis, which rested on the conclusion that rulemaking is 
itself a legislative function in Florida,274 would be relatively foreign to 
federal separation-of-powers jurisprudence, which continues to 
embrace the notion—albeit perhaps a fiction—that rulemaking 
performed by agencies is executive rather than legislative in nature.275 
Nonetheless, Whiley does illustrate the very real threat of legal 
challenges to executive-driven suspensions of rulemaking. In doing 
so, it suggests the need for caution surrounding executive-driven hard 
moratoria and for more study surrounding whether U.S. presidents or 
state governors possess the legal authority to direct agencies to 
suspend rulemaking pursuant to applicable federal or state law. 
 
 270. Id. at *3. 
 271. Id. at *8 (emphasis omitted).  
 272. Id. at *10.  
 273. Id.  
 274. See id. at *5 (“[R]ulemaking is a legislative function.”); id. at *10 (“The Legislature 
retains the sole right to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies, and all provisions in 
both Executive Order 11-01 or 11-72 that operate to suspend rulemaking contrary to the APA 
constitute an encroachment upon a legislative function.”). 
 275. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (noting that the 
Constitution permits no delegation of Congress’s legislative powers). But see id. at 489 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the text of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, “do[es] not purport to limit the authority of [Congress] to 
delegate authority to others”). 
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b. Undermining Transparency.  Another cost of hard 
moratoria—regardless of whether the moratoria are ordered by the 
executive branch or by the legislature—is that they may undermine 
transparency because they are implemented largely behind closed 
doors. For example, even though President George H.W. Bush’s 1992 
moratorium directed agencies to “submit a written report” to the 
president indicating the “regulatory changes recommended or 
made,”276 these reports were not easily accessible to the public. 
Indeed, the Bush White House—reportedly claiming “executive 
privilege”—refused a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)277 request 
made by OMB Watch and Public Citizen seeking data to support 
President Bush’s claim of billions in cost savings stemming from the 
moratorium.278 Public Citizen and OMB Watch then followed up with 
additional FOIA requests to twenty-four different agencies, asking 
for background data on President Bush’s claim of savings as well as 
copies of the reports that agencies were required to file with the 
president after the first ninety days of the moratorium.279 According to 
OMB Watch and Public Citizen, most agencies responded, but their 
reports did not describe affected regulations with much detail280: 
“None of the agencies provided information about ‘cost savings’ in a 
form even remotely understandable. Often agencies decided such 
documents constituted ‘predecisional’ material [exempted under 
FOIA] and blocked out large portions of it; in other cases, sheets of 
paper with hand-scrawled calculations were provided.”281  
Although these concerns about a lack of transparency are 
troubling, they—unlike other costs accompanying hard moratoria—
could be overcome fairly easily. In particular, Washington state’s 
implementation of its rulemaking suspension provides a model of 
sorts. There, the Office of Financial Management directed agencies to 
report “the number of rules eliminated or suspended in response to 
[Governor Gregoire’s] order as well as the number of and 
justification for rules that proceeded through development and/or 
 
 276. Bush, supra note 41, at 168.  
 277. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 278. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii–iii.  
 279. Id. at 23. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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adoption,”282 and various state agencies responded by making their 
reports easily accessible to the public online.283 
c. Creating Protracted Regulatory Confusion.  A much more 
troubling risk of both legislative- and executive-driven hard moratoria 
is that such moratoria may lead to protracted confusion about their 
scope. For example, how should North Carolina’s legislative ban on 
rules that are not “necessary to serve the public interest” be read?284 
Or how should people read Washington state’s decision to exempt 
rules that are “necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare 
or necessary to avoid an immediate threat to the state’s natural 
resources” from its rulemaking suspension?285 As one court has 
recognized in another context, “‘necessary’ is a chameleon-like word 
whose meaning . . . may be influenced by its context.”286 If the term 
“necessary” is interpreted leniently, then few—if any—new rules 
might be barred, given that all authorized rules might in some way or 
another be viewed as necessary to the public interest. Alternatively, if 
“necessary” is interpreted stringently, then it might be read to forbid 
all rules that lack a sense of immediate emergency and hence could 
operate as a very broad ban. Because of this ambiguity, state agencies 
in Washington reportedly had “difficulty . . . identifying which rules 
would be put on hold” immediately after Governor Gregoire ordered 
the moratorium in Washington in 2010.287 
These sorts of interpretive questions are a major reason why 
Sally Katzen—testifying on behalf of the Clinton administration in 
1995—opposed Congress’s attempt to impose a federal regulatory 
 
 282. Memorandum from Kari Burrell, Exec. Policy Dir., to Agency Dirs., supra note 164, at 
2.  
 283. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 220 (listing the rulemakings that have been 
delayed and those that will continue); Department of Health and State Board of Health Rule 
Making Activities, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/Rules/pdf/
EO1103_Moratorium_rulemaking_masterlist.pdf (last updated Oct. 14, 2011) (same); 
Temporary Rule-Making Suspension, DEP’T OF REVENUE, WASH. STATE (Jan. 5, 2011), http://
dor.wa.gov/Content/FindALawOrRule/RuleMaking/tempSuspension.aspx (same).  
 284. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.  
 285. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.  
 286. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 287. Jim Camden, Order Puts Moratorium on Nonessential Rules: Stability for Businesses 
Expected To Help State, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Nov. 18, 2010, at 7A (expressing 
the business community’s concern that “[t]he potential exemptions are so broad that no one can 
be sure” and that “‘[i]t’s practically impossible to figure out what the executive order will apply 
to and what it won’t apply to’” (quoting Eric de Place of Sightline Institute, a sustainable-energy 
organization)).  
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moratorium. Specifically, Katzen explained the Clinton 
administration’s fears about protracted confusion as follows: “The 
people who will be caught up in these debates are the same officials 
who would otherwise spend their time working on substantive 
solutions to the real problems with the regulatory system.”288 In other 
words, if weeding out inefficient regulations and reforming the 
regulatory system are truly top priorities, then spending time fighting 
“about what is in or out of a moratorium” rather than focusing on 
identifying ill-advised regulations may prove unproductive.289 
d. Evincing a Blunt Antiregulatory Bias.  Yet another major 
downside of hard moratoria is that they operate in a very blunt 
manner, often demonstrating an antiregulatory bias that seems to 
suggest that all regulations are inherently bad.290 Yet “not all 
regulations are bad, nor are they all good.”291 Rather, regulations 
seeking to ensure safe products, clean air and water, a healthy 
economy, and equal opportunities in education, employment, and 
housing “have the potential to be either” good or bad depending on 
how they are crafted and chosen.292 
Given that regulations have the potential to be good or bad 
depending on how they are crafted, halting the regulatory machinery 
through a one-size-fits-all approach via a moratorium that would stop 
“good regulations, bad regulations, [and] in between regulations” 
makes little sense.293 In other words, simply assuming that less 
regulation or the status quo—preserved through a moratorium—is 
better than what the administration might produce in the future is 
overly simplistic. If the goal is to avoid unnecessary and overly 
burdensome regulations, then closely scrutinizing rules based on their 
merits to make sure that the government regulates only when 
appropriate and in a cost-effective manner makes much more sense. 
This is the view that President Clinton took in 1995 when—in 
speaking out against Republican leaders’ efforts to push through a 
 
 288. S. 219—Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, supra note 83, at 11 (statement of Sally 
Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management 
and Budget).  
 289. Id. at 8.  
 290. See id. at 11 (“[A] moratorium is a blunderbuss approach that delays rules based on 
necessarily arbitrary categories . . . .”).  
 291. Id. at 6.  
 292. Id. at 8.  
 293. Id. at 6.  
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federal moratorium—he said that those pushing for a moratorium 
“don’t want reform, they really want rigor mortis.”294 
In short, although “nameless ‘regulations’ may be a convenient 
whipping boy” for those who want to avoid regulatory burdens,295 
hard regulatory moratoria are an ill-advised method of weeding out 
unnecessary or overly burdensome regulations. Many other methods 
of oversight and political control, including redrafting statutory 
delegations to agencies, executive oversight via appointment and 
removal powers, legislative hearings, and public participation through 
notice-and-comment procedures, already exist and can be used to 
help avoid improper regulations.296 These methods of political 
control—not the blunt, one-size-fits-all approach of a regulatory 
moratorium, which assumes that the status quo is better than any 
regulations the administration might produce in the future—should 
be used to weed out bad regulations moving forward. 
B. Soft Moratoria: A Potentially Useful Tool for Political Control by 
the Executive Branch During Brief Periods of Political Transition 
Unlike hard moratoria, which have little to commend them, soft 
moratoria might well serve a very different and useful purpose: 
enabling those newly in power to align the regulatory machinery with 
their policy preferences—regardless of whether those policy 
preferences are regulatory or deregulatory in nature—upon a change 
in administration, thereby furthering principles of democratic 
accountability. 
1. The Main Benefit of Soft Moratoria: Aligning the Regulatory 
Machinery with the New Administration’s Policies.  As for the benefits 
of regulatory moratoria, some of the same arguments considered in 
Section A with respect to hard moratoria are relevant. For example, 
political symbolism might well be at work in the context of soft 
 
 294. John M. Broder & Kelly Owen, Clinton Assails GOP Regulatory Proposal, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 1995, at A16 (quoting President Clinton) (internal quotation mark omitted). Cass 
Sunstein also has noted the “blunderbuss” nature of the moratorium proposed in 1995. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 247, 273 (1996) (“[A] general moratorium on federal regulation is reactionary in the 
worst way—a crude, lazy, and pandering response to current problems. Its blunderbuss quality 
ensures that it will stop measures that are otherwise required by law, or that would do a lot of 
good, as well as measures that warrant reconsideration (which a moratorium by itself fails to 
provide).”).  
 295. S. REP. NO. 104-15, at 26 (1995). 
 296. Cf. supra note 1. 
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moratoria as it is in the context of hard moratoria.297 In addition, 
proponents of soft moratoria—just like proponents of hard 
moratoria—often justify moratoria as a means of achieving cost 
savings, creating jobs, and giving the economy a boost,298 even though 
these asserted cost savings and economic benefits generally have yet 
to be proven via careful study. 
Yet one additional reason that is lacking in the context of hard 
moratoria does exist to support the imposition of soft moratoria: soft 
moratoria, which are imposed at the beginning of a period of political 
transition, give the new administration a brief transitional period 
within which to ensure that midnight rules promulgated by the prior 
administration are consistent with the policies of the new 
administration, thereby furthering notions of democratic 
accountability and political responsiveness. 
Midnight rulemaking, which often occurs postelection at the 
eleventh hour, is widely thought to represent “an illegitimate vehicle 
for projecting an outgoing administration’s policy agenda beyond the 
end of its term.”299 For one thing, as Professor Jack Beermann puts it, 
a general discomfort seems to exist with the notion that a lame-duck, 
outgoing administration might wait “until late in the term to take 
politically controversial action or load[] up on late-term actions to 
project its policy preferences in the future.”300 In addition, cynical 
questions often arise about “why, if the regulation was deemed so 
important, the administration failed to act during the previous three 
or seven and three-quarters years.”301 
Yet even if this cynicism surrounding the motives behind 
midnight rules is set to one side and even if one ascribes completely 
honorable motives to the outgoing administration, midnight 
rulemaking is still problematic for another even more important 
 
 297. See, e.g., Precious, supra note 10 (noting that Governor Pataki froze rulemaking in New 
York, “[l]iving up to his campaign promise to be business friendly”).  
 298. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2011-001, at 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf 
(“[S]uch an effort is timely given current unemployment levels and state budget difficulties, in 
order to create economic opportunity for each and every New Mexican, while protecting and 
preserving the health, safety and welfare of our community.”); Memorandum from Janice K. 
Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs., supra note 139, at 342 (encouraging 
agencies to act “in the interest of sound regulatory practice and the avoidance of costly, 
burdensome, or unnecessary rules”). 
 299. Beermann, supra note 35, at 369.  
 300. Id. at 353.  
 301. Id.  
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reason: it is difficult to square with scholars’ embrace of the “political 
control” model of the administrative state, which legitimizes federal 
agency action by stressing that agencies are subject to political 
control.302 The political-control model “acknowledges that many 
policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through 
a myopic technocratic lens but rather are highly political decisions 
that should be made by politically accountable institutions.”303 As 
Professor Nina Mendelson explains, in embracing the political-control 
model, scholars have relied “heavily upon the President as a major 
source of democratic responsiveness and accountability,” and even 
those scholars “who do not see presidential control as central see it as 
a significant feature of a legitimate administrative state.”304 
When regulation occurs postelection, after voters have lost “an 
important tool for holding agencies accountable,”305 the political-
control model breaks down.306 Enabling the incoming administration 
to freeze the regulatory machinery via a soft moratorium upon 
coming into office is one way to deal with this breakdown in political 
accountability and responsiveness. Such soft moratoria empower new 
chief executives to change course quickly from their predecessors and 
to align the regulatory machinery with their policy preferences—
regardless of whether those policy preferences are deregulatory or 
regulatory in nature.307 
 
 302. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009) (describing the rise in the political-control model); see also 
Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New 
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 580 (2003) (“[T]he dominant version of the principal-
agent approach to the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies is now the presidential 
control model.”).  
 303. Watts, supra note 302, at 35.  
 304. Mendelson, supra note 302, at 567–68; cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).  
 305. Mendelson, supra note 302, at 566–67.  
 306. See id. (noting that postelection regulation raises concerns about democratic 
responsiveness and legitimacy).  
 307. See Jack, supra note 13, at 1517 (noting that “[t]he continued use of rule withdrawals 
and rule suspensions by incoming presidential administrations over the last twenty years 
suggests these presidential directives are here to stay” and that “[t]hey will likely be used in 
regulatory review plans by Republicans as well as Democrats, by administrations with a 
deregulatory bias, as well as those administrations that have a favorable view of federal 
regulations”).  
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Given these important benefits relating to political accountability 
and responsiveness that flow from soft moratoria,308 one can see why 
soft moratoria have become so well entrenched at the federal level 
during presidential transitions and why they have been used by 
Democratic and Republican presidents alike.309 It also suggests that, at 
the state level, incoming governors, regardless of party affiliation, 
should consider soft moratoria as a potentially useful political tool 
rather than leaving the tool primarily in the hands of Republican 
governors who seek to push a deregulatory agenda, as has been the 
trend in the states. 
2. The Major Risks of Soft Moratoria.  Despite the significant 
value of enabling political control and furthering democratic 
accountability at the beginning of a new administration, soft 
moratoria raise a variety of risks, including legal questions about 
whether the executive branch possesses the authority to order even a 
temporary suspension of rulemaking at the start of a new 
administration. In addition, soft moratoria also raise (1) transparency 
concerns, (2) the potential for regulatory confusion, and (3) the risk 
that soft moratoria will morph into hard moratoria. Some of these 
downsides of soft moratoria, including the legal issues, concerns 
about transparency, and the potential for regulatory confusion, are 
similar to the risks facing hard moratoria, yet—as this Section 
discusses—soft moratoria can overcome these potential risks more 
easily than hard moratoria can. 
a. Inviting Legal Costs.  One major concern surrounding soft 
moratoria—as is the case with hard moratoria—has to do with the 
 
 308. This is not to suggest that soft moratoria are the only way that an incoming 
administration could be empowered to deal with midnight rulemaking, but rather that soft 
moratoria are a viable and well-entrenched tool for empowering a new chief executive. Other 
tools that might empower the incoming administration should be explored as well. See, e.g., 
Beermann, supra note 35, at 354–59 (discussing the Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. 
(2009), a bill proposed in Congress that would have given the incoming administration the 
power to disapprove of regulations adopted during the last ninety days of the outgoing 
administration); Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark? In Favor of Empowering the 
President-Elect, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 468–72 (2009), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/19/LRColl2009n19Mendelson.pdf (exploring the 
possibility of statutory amendments that would increase a president-elect’s power).  
 309. See Ari Cuenin, Note, Mooting the Night Away: Postinauguration Midnight-Rule 
Changes and Vacatur for Mootness, 60 DUKE L.J. 453, 478 (2010) (“[T]hese suspension and 
withdrawal memoranda are frequently suggested to new presidents as one of the most effective 
means for handling midnight regulations.”). 
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various legal challenges that could arise, especially over separation-
of-powers concerns. Depending on the specific terms of a soft 
moratorium, a variety of legal issues might arise, including whether 
the new chief executive can order (1) a freeze on new rules, (2) the 
withdrawal of final rules after they have been sent for publication but 
before actual publication, or (3) the postponement of the effective 
dates of final rules that already have been published. Although these 
potential legal issues all deserve consideration, none seems to doom 
the legality of soft moratoria, especially if careful drafting is used. 
i. Separation-of-Powers Questions Stemming from a Freeze on 
New Rules.  An executive-driven soft moratorium calling for a 
general freeze on all new rules during a political transition could 
potentially trigger constitutional separation-of-powers questions 
under applicable federal or state law similar to the separation-of-
powers questions raised by hard executive moratoria.310 At least at the 
federal level,311 however, soft moratoria ordered by newly elected 
presidents likely would pass constitutional muster, for at least two 
reasons. 
First, and most importantly, soft moratoria, unlike hard 
moratoria, are limited in duration to brief periods of political 
transition. They are designed not to halt rulemaking for extended 
periods of time but rather simply to enable the newly elected 
president—exercising his constitutionally granted powers to appoint 
officers—to get his appointees in place before the regulatory 
machinery moves forward.312 In this sense, one can hardly say that soft 
moratoria enable the president to decide the substance of regulatory 
decisions delegated by Congress to agency actors by locking into 
place the status quo. Rather, soft moratoria merely enable the 
president to effectuate his appointment powers by staffing the 
executive branch with his appointees prior to allowing new 
rulemakings to continue. Hence, even if—contrary to the unitary-
executive theory—the president merely has the power to oversee 
 
 310. See supra notes 241–75 and accompanying text.  
 311. At the state level, the answer could be different depending on each state’s own 
constitutional and statutory requirements.  
 312. The president’s appointment powers are spelled out in the Constitution in the 
Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for . . . .”).  
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administrative action but not to decide the substance of decisions 
delegated to agency officials by law, a temporary freeze of 
discretionary rulemaking would not seem to cross the line from 
overseeing to deciding the substance of regulatory actions.313 
Second, a soft moratorium could be viewed as a mere request, 
rather than a command that new rules be put on hold during the 
political transition.314 Even though agency heads likely feel significant 
pressure to comply with the president’s wishes, particularly at the 
beginning of a new administration, if the agency ultimately complies 
with the president’s wishes and puts the new rules on hold, then the 
president will not have violated the law by somehow usurping the 
agency’s power or by deciding for himself the substance of regulatory 
decisions delegated to the agency by Congress. 
Finally, another reason—albeit a much more controversial and 
less persuasive reason—for concluding that soft moratoria are 
constitutional at the federal level would be to say that the practice has 
gained constitutional legitimacy through the entrenched practice of 
presidents’ coming into office and freezing new rules.315 After all, 
Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama all 
imposed a temporary freeze on new rules upon coming into the White 
House. For those who are willing to apply the logic of this kind of 
“constitutional adverse possession,”316 the fact that four of five 
consecutive presidents have temporarily suspended rulemaking while 
getting their appointees into place would likely help to legitimate soft 
moratoria at the federal level. Needless to say, however, this 
acquiescence argument is not a slam dunk. Take, for example, the 
one- and two-house vetoes, which the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha317 despite the fact that they had 
 
 313. Cf. supra note 261 and accompanying text.  
 314. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“requesting” that agencies take the steps outlined in the 
memorandum).  
 315. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to 
uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of 
Art. II.”). 
 316. See William A. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation 
and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 203–09 (2008) (discussing 
the notion of “constitutional adverse possession” and its pitfalls). 
 317. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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been employed by Congress for decades prior to the Supreme Court’s 
striking them down.318 
ii. The Legality of Ordering the Withdrawal of Final Regulations 
After They Have Been Sent for Publication but Before Actual 
Publication.  Another legal question that could crop up with respect 
to soft moratoria is whether the new chief executive may permissibly 
order the withdrawal of final regulations prior to publication. 
Presidents Clinton,319 George W. Bush,320 and Obama,321 as well as 
governors in Arizona322 and New Jersey,323 have all ordered agencies 
to initiate these sorts of rule withdrawals prior to publication of the 
final rules.324 
 
 318. See id. at 955–60 (discussing narrow situations in which Congress can act unicamerally 
and holding the one-house veto unconstitutional).  
 319. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section 
1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993) (“[Agency heads] are 
requested to withdraw from the Federal Register for approval [by an agency head appointed by 
President Clinton] . . . all regulations that have not yet been published in the Federal 
Register . . . .”). 
 320. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (“With respect to regulations that have been 
sent to the [Office of the Federal Register (OFR)] but not published in the Federal Register, 
withdraw them from OFR for review and approval [by an agency head appointed by President 
Bush] . . . .”). 
 321. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Withdraw from the OFR all proposed or final regulations that have 
not been published in the Federal Register so that they can be reviewed and approved by a 
department or agency head [appointed by President Obama] . . . .”).  
 322. See Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting 
Dirs., supra note 139 (“With respect to proposed rules that have been sent to the Secretary of 
State but not published in the Arizona Administrative Register, withdraw them from the 
Secretary of State.”). 
 323. See Exec. Order. No. 1 para. 2 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/info
bank/circular/eocc1.pdf (“With respect to any proposed administrative regulation or rule that 
may have been transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, but has not been published in 
the New Jersey Register, the head of the State agency proposing the regulation or rule shall 
withdraw the proposed regulation or rule in a manner consistent with the Rules for Agency 
Rulemaking and procedures of the Office of Administrative Law.”).  
 324. The withdrawal involved an unpublished proposed rule—as opposed to a final rule—
that seemed to be legally permissible. See A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act 
and Recent Federal Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & 
Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 121–22 (2001) (prepared 
statement of Thomas O. McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair, University of Texas School of 
Law) (noting that the withdrawal of unpublished proposed rules at the beginning of the Bush 
administration was likely legal because most rulemakings are not commenced until notice is 
actually published in accordance with section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000)).  
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Although the question is complicated, this kind of a command to 
agencies might withstand legal scrutiny at the federal level. In 
particular, support for agencies’ power to withdraw unpublished rules 
can be found in a D.C. Circuit opinion, which held that an agency has 
the power to withdraw its rule from the Federal Register before the 
rule has been made public and during the three-day confidential 
processing period.325 Although the D.C. Circuit opinion left open the 
question of whether an agency may withdraw an unpublished rule 
after the confidential processing period but before publication, the 
Office of the Federal Register (OFR) has taken the view that 
agencies have the right to withdraw documents that have been filed 
for public inspection but that have not yet been published by the 
OFR.326 Hence, one commentator—relying heavily upon the OFR’s 
own views and the fact that the OFR’s views might receive deference 
from the courts—concludes that the withdrawal of unpublished final 
and proposed rules, even after the OFR has made them available for 
public inspection, “appears to be valid.”327 In addition, in a statement 
before Congress after the Bush transition in 2001, Professor Thomas 
McGarity expressed his view that “it is legally permissible for the 
agency that sent the rule to the [OFR] to withdraw the submission” so 
long as the signed rule had not yet been published in the Federal 
Register.328 
Nonetheless, reason for caution still exists at the federal level. In 
particular, in one case, a federal district court concluded that a rule 
conferring a substantive benefit became final once it had been signed 
by the agency and sent to the Federal Register.329 Although the Second 
Circuit reversed, it did so on the ground that the signed final rule 
stated that it was to be effective upon publication in the Federal 
 
 325. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
 326. 1 C.F.R. § 18.13 (2011) (“A document that has been filed for public inspection with the 
Office of the Federal Register but not yet published, may be withdrawn from publication or 
corrected by the submitting agency.”).  
 327. Jack, supra note 13, at 1494–95.  
 328. A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations, 
supra note 324, at 123 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair, 
University of Texas School of Law).  
 329. See Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[W]here a rule 
confers a substantive benefit to a person, an agency must comply with it, even if the rule is not 
published.”), rev’d sub nom. Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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Register and that the required publication had not yet occurred.330 
Hence, this holding left open the possibility that a rule designed to 
confer a benefit could be treated as effective and enforced against the 
government if the rule’s effective date precedes publication. 
In addition, at the state level, a decision by the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico in 2011, New Energy Economy, Inc. v. Martinez,331 
provides reason for caution. The case involved a regulation 
promulgated by the Environmental Improvement Board after a two-
year rulemaking process and regulations promulgated by the Water 
Quality Control Commission after a one-year rulemaking process.332 
Both rules had been transmitted to the State Records Center and 
Archives (Records Center) for filing and publication, and both had 
been slated for publication in the January 14, 2011, edition of the New 
Mexico Register.333 On January 1, 2011, however, newly elected 
Governor Martinez suspended rulemaking in the state for ninety 
days.334 After correspondence between the Records Center and the 
governor’s office, the acting cabinet secretary of the New Mexico 
Environment Department gave the Records Center written 
notification that it was not to publish the regulations.335 Proponents of 
the rules then filed suit, arguing that a writ of mandamus was 
appropriate to order publication of the regulations.336 The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico agreed, finding that the state records 
administrator had a clear, indisputable, and nondiscretionary duty 
under state law to publish the regulations notwithstanding the 
regulatory freeze imposed by the governor.337 Hence, the case suggests 
that drafters of soft moratoria in the states should carefully consult 
state law when deciding whether to call upon agencies to suspend the 
publication of unpublished rules after they have been sent to the state 
register. If the law is unclear, the safest route when crafting a soft 
 
 330. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 749 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the effective date of 
the rule was timed to publication), superseded on other grounds by statute, Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-
546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2006)).  
 331. New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286 (N.M. 2011).  
 332. Id. at 288. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id.  
 335. Id. at 288–89.  
 336. Id. at 289.  
 337. Id. at 293.  
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moratorium would be to leave untouched unpublished regulations 
after they have been sent for publication. 
iii. The Legality of Suspending the Effective Date of a Final, 
Published Regulation.  Yet another legal question that has plagued 
the use of some soft moratoria at the federal level is whether it is legal 
to order the suspension of final, published agency regulations prior to 
their effective dates,338 as Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush did 
when coming into office.339 The basic issue boils down to this: Can an 
agency delay a notice-and-comment rule prior to its effective date 
without going through notice-and-comment procedures? Or is the 
delay itself a rule that is subject to notice-and-comment 
requirements? Some cases involving interpretations of the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)340 touch on these questions at 
the federal level. These cases demonstrate that the delay of a final, 
published rule constitutes a “rule” within the meaning of the APA 
and hence requires that notice and comment be allowed before 
delaying the effective date of the rule,341 unless one of the APA’s 
exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking applies, such as the 
procedural-rule exemption or the “good cause” exemption.342 
 
 338. There seems to be no question that agencies can legally withdraw published proposed 
rules. See A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations, 
supra note 324, at 122 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair, 
University of Texas School of Law) (noting that there is “probably no legal impediment to 
withdrawing a published notice of proposed rulemaking”).  
 339. See Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (“To the extent permitted by law, your agency shall, by 
notice in the Federal Register, postpone for 60 days from the date of this memorandum the 
effective date of all regulations that your agency has promulgated in final form and that are 
scheduled to become effective during such 60-day period.”); Memorandum for the Heads and 
Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) 
(asking agency heads, “[w]ith respect to regulations that have been published in the OFR but 
have not taken effect, temporarily [to] postpone the effective date of the regulations for 60 
days”).  
 340. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 341. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We 
conclude that, under the facts of this case, EPA’s action in indefinitely postponing the effective 
date of the amendments fit the definition of ‘rule’ in the APA, and, as such, was subject to the 
APA’s rulemaking requirements.”); Council of S. Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 580–82 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing how deferring the implementation of regulations generally requires 
notice-and-comment procedures); see also JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL 
AGENCY RULEMAKING 119–20 (4th ed. 2006) (“[R]egardless of the duration of a 
postponement, a delay of a rule’s effective date is normally considered a ‘rule’ within the 
meaning of the APA so as to require notice-and-comment rulemaking.”). 
 342. See APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (exempting procedural rules and rules for which 
there is “good cause,” such as impracticability).  
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One commentator concludes that the federal APA’s procedural-
rule exemption might exempt certain, but not all, brief rule delays 
from notice-and-comment requirements because the brief delay of 
some rules might not affect the rights and interests of private 
parties.343 In addition, another commentator asserts that a brief delay 
in a rule’s effective date might be permissible even without notice-
and-comment procedures by relying upon the APA’s good-cause 
exception, as requiring an agency to hold notice and comment on a 
decision about whether to delay a rule before running up against its 
effective date might be impractical in some circumstances.344 In his 
statement to Congress in 2001, however, Professor McGarity 
concluded that neither exemption could be used to avoid notice-and-
comment procedures when delaying the effective date of a final, 
published rule.345 
Hence, in light of these unresolved and complicated legal 
questions, cautious drafters of soft moratoria might choose not to 
order the suspension of the effective date of final, published rules to 
avoid the threat of legal challenges.346 This strategy is what President 
Clinton pursued. When he came into office, he ordered a freeze on 
new rules and the withdrawal of rules that had not yet been 
published, but—unlike Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush347—
he did not order the suspension of already-published, final rules.348 
 
 343. See Jack, supra note 13, at 1505–08 (concluding that some but not all rule suspensions 
made by the Bush administration pursuant to the Card Memorandum, Memorandum for the 
Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 
2001), may have fallen within the APA’s procedural-rule exemption because the temporary 
delay might not have substantially affected private parties’ interest in the final rule).  
 344. See Beermann, supra note 13, at 983 & n.120 (noting that the good-cause exemption 
should support sixty-day delays). But see Jack, supra note 13, at 1515–17 (concluding that 
agencies should give notice and an opportunity to comment on rule delays and that a generic 
invocation of “good cause” should not suffice to avoid notice and comment).  
 345. A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations, 
supra note 324, at 125 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair, 
University of Texas School of Law); see also Sanford, supra note 13, at 801–07 (arguing that in 
the wake of the Card Memorandum issued under the Bush administration, agencies could not 
legally delay the effective dates of regulations that had already been published because the 
delays had substantive impact and triggered an obligation for agencies to give adequate reasons 
for the delays under arbitrary-and-capricious review).  
 346. Because states have their own administrative-procedure acts, the analysis at the state 
level could differ depending on the state and its requirements.  
 347. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 348. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section 
1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993). 
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Alternatively, if the drafter of a soft moratorium wishes to call 
for the suspension of the effective date of final rules after publication, 
then limiting the potential delay to a brief sixty-day period, as the text 
of both President Reagan’s and President Bush’s memoranda did, 
would be wise.349 In addition, to further reduce the likelihood of legal 
challenges, drafters of soft moratoria might consider following in the 
footsteps of President Obama. His regulatory-review memorandum 
made the suspension of final rules permissive by directing agencies 
merely to “[c]onsider extending for 60 days the effective date of 
regulations that have been published in the Federal Register but not 
yet taken effect . . . for the purpose of reviewing questions of law and 
policy raised by those regulations.”350 In addition, it expressly directed 
that if an agency were to choose to extend the effective dates of 
regulations, then the agency should “immediately reopen the notice-
and-comment period for 30 days to allow interested parties to provide 
comments about issues of law and policy raised by those rules.”351 
Furthermore, Peter Orszag, the director of OMB under President 
Obama, issued a clarifying memorandum to agency heads at the 
outset of the Obama administration, noting, “If you determine that 
you want to extend the effective date for purposes of enabling further 
review, you should promptly provide a 30-day notice-and-comment 
period, seeking public comment about both your contemplated 
extension of the effective date and the rule in question.”352 If the rule at 
issue would “take effect before there [had been] sufficient time to 
solicit and review comments on the extension of the effective date,” 
then Orszag directed agencies to “consult immediately with [the 
Office of Legal Counsel] and OIRA about the appropriate course of 
action.”353 
b. Undermining Transparency.  Another concern surrounding 
soft moratoria—as with hard moratoria—is that they suffer from a 
 
 349. See Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (postponing effectiveness of published rules for sixty 
days); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (same).  
 350. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435, 4435–36 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 351. Id.  
 352. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of 
the President, to the Heads & Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/agencyinformation_
memoranda_2009_pdf/m09-08.pdf (emphasis added).  
 353. Id.  
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lack of transparency and openness,354 not only from the public’s 
perspective but also perhaps from the new administration’s 
perspective. For example, as Professor Beermann notes, after 
President George W. Bush implemented a soft moratorium at the 
beginning of his administration pursuant to what is called the Card 
Memorandum,355 it was “unclear how many such rules there were, and 
because they had not yet been published, no sign of them appear[ed] 
in the Federal Register itself.”356 Nor were there “any documents in 
the Federal Register that reflect[ed] the withdrawal of a submitted 
but unpublished rule or proposal, or a decision not to publish a rule 
so as to comply with” the Card Memorandum.357 Indeed, OMB 
admitted in February 2001 that “it did not know how many rules were 
delayed, or how many rules were exempted from the Card 
Memorandum because of judicial or statutory deadlines, or 
emergency situations relating to health and safety.”358 The “only 
information available on the identity, number, and character of 
delayed rules came from” a General Accounting Office report 
published in February 2002 as a result of congressional oversight.359 
In the context of soft moratoria, this lack of openness and 
transparency is troubling for two reasons. First, if a new 
administration lacks an organized system for tracking rules affected 
by and exempted from a soft moratorium, it will find it difficult to 
“oversee and monitor the implementation of [its] regulatory 
review”360 effectively, thereby undercutting the usefulness of soft 
moratoria as a tool for political control. Second, from the public’s 
perspective, the lack of transparency could undermine perceptions 
about the validity of the regulatory process. 
As with hard moratoria, however, these transparency-related 
concerns could be remedied through disclosure requirements that 
 
 354. See supra notes 276–81 and accompanying text; see also Jack, supra note 13, at 1512–14 
(describing the lack of transparency characterizing President George W. Bush’s regulatory 
review at the beginning of his administration).  
 355. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001). 
 356. Beermann, supra note 13, at 991. 
 357. Id.  
 358. Jack, supra note 13, at 1513.  
 359. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-370R, REGULATORY 
REVIEW: DELAY OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
JANUARY 20, 2001, MEMORANDUM (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02370r
.pdf). 
 360. Id. at 1514.  
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would force disclosure and enable greater oversight. For example, 
federal agencies that are subject to soft moratoria could be required 
to publish in the Federal Register “a list of the regulations that either 
are not sent to or are withdrawn from OFR following a presidential 
transition,”361 as well as a list of any rules whose effective dates are 
delayed. Likewise, state agencies could be required to publish a list of 
affected regulations in their state’s administrative register. 
c. Creating a Risk of Some Regulatory Confusion.  Yet another 
problem facing soft moratoria—one also relevant to hard moratoria—
is that confusion is likely to surface surrounding the meaning and 
scope of any moratorium.362 After Governor Schwarzenegger initiated 
a temporary rulemaking freeze in California upon coming into office, 
for example, confusion erupted over whether the regulatory 
moratorium would “delay or alter a law requiring greater water 
efficiency for California clothes washers, which could keep the state 
from saving billions of gallons in water use.”363 Although these 
concerns about regulatory confusion are very real, they seem much 
less acute in the context of soft moratoria than in that of hard 
moratoria. This is because soft moratoria, by their terms, are keyed to 
brief periods of political transition, such as sixty- or ninety-day 
periods364 or until an agency head appointed by the newly elected 
chief executive has authorized the new rules to move forward.365 
Hence, unlike hard moratoria, soft moratoria should not pose a 
significant risk of protracted, lengthy confusion. 
 
 361. Gale Lea Rubrecht, President Obama Halts Midnight Regulations, 24 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 47, 49 (2009). 
 362. See supra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.  
 363. Anna Oberthur, Order May Delay Water-Saving Clothes Washer Law, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sdcwa.org/clips/2003/dec/121403/121403ordermay
delay.html.  
 364. See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (directing agencies to refrain for sixty days from 
promulgating any new rules).  
 365. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (ordering agencies to refrain from sending any proposed or final 
regulations to the Federal Register unless they have been approved by an appointee of President 
Obama); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (ordering agencies to send no proposed or 
final regulations to the Federal Register unless they have been approved by an appointee of 
President Bush); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in 
Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993) (directing that no 
proposed or final regulations should be sent to the Federal Register for publication unless they 
have been approved by an appointee of President Clinton).  
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d. The Blurring of Soft and Hard Moratoria.  Still another 
concern surrounding soft moratoria is that either their duration will 
be longer than necessary to effectuate a smooth change in political 
administration or they will easily morph from soft moratoria into hard 
moratoria. An example of the former problem occurred in California, 
where Governor Schwarzenegger put a six-month freeze on 
rulemaking in the state upon coming into office.366 Examples of the 
latter problem can be found in New York, where Governor Pataki 
initially announced a ninety-day rulemaking freeze keyed to his 
entrance into office but then later repeatedly extended the 
moratorium,367 as well as in Arizona, where a combination of 
legislative and executive action turned what began as a limited three-
month rulemaking freeze into a multiyear moratorium.368 
Furthermore, some soft moratoria have poorly defined end 
dates, ordering agencies to avoid promulgating any new rules until 
the rules have been approved by an agency head appointed by the 
incoming administration.369 As one commentator notes in the context 
of President George W. Bush’s moratorium, this approach leaves the 
duration of any freeze somewhat open-ended because the freeze may 
be, for example, contingent on “how fast agency appointees can be 
vetted, approved with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
caught up to speed on pending proposed or final rules within their 
agencies.”370 
The easiest way to minimize these sorts of problems would be to 
ensure that soft moratoria are defined in terms of a specific number 
of days. Given that the goal of a soft moratorium is simply to enable 
the incoming administration to align the regulatory machinery with its 
policy preferences, a sixty- or ninety-day freeze on new rules 
generally should prove sufficient. Indeed, a sixty-day period would be 
in line with some of the provisions found in federal moratoria ordered 
by incoming presidents, such as Reagan, who put a freeze on new 
rules for a sixty-day period upon coming into the White House,371 and 
George W. Bush, who ordered agencies to suspend for sixty days the 
effective dates of regulations that had been published in the Federal 
 
 366. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 367. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.  
 368. See supra notes 139–40, 176–81 and accompanying text.  
 369. See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
 370. Jack, supra note 13, at 1514–15 (footnote omitted).  
 371. Reagan, supra note 26, at 63. 
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Register but that were not yet final.372 Alternatively, a ninety-day 
period would be consistent with—or longer than—soft moratoria 
implemented in some states.373 
In an effort to resolve these sorts of issues in a uniform manner, 
one solution that warrants future consideration would be the 
enactment of permanent congressional legislation establishing a soft 
moratorium at the beginning of new presidential terms to enable the 
incoming administration to review any midnight rules and compare 
them with the policies of the incoming administration.374 Such 
legislation could clearly specify the period of time available for review 
of midnight rules by the new administration—for example, sixty or 
ninety days—thereby eliminating concerns that soft moratoria might 
drag out too long or morph into hard moratoria. In addition, such 
legislation could incorporate transparency requirements, ensuring 
that soft moratoria are implemented in an open manner. Such 
legislation also would help to settle any constitutional separation-of-
powers questions that might hover over executive-driven moratoria. 
This is because the legislature itself, not the executive, would be the 
body electing to turn soft moratoria into a normal, expected part of 
the transitional process.375  
 
 372. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001). 
 373. See Exec. Order No. 1 para. 1 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/info
bank/circular/eocc1.pdf (ordering a ninety-day freeze); Exec. Order No. 95-3 para. 1 (R.I. Jan. 
25, 1995), available at http://www.uri.edu/library/special_collections/almond/execord/95-03.html 
(same); Exec. Order No. 2011-001, at 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf 
(determining that “ninety days is a reasonable time to review such proposed and pending rules 
and regulations, to examine them from various perspectives as to their workability, 
reasonableness, and determine whether they are proper and necessary”); Press Release, 
Governor Bill Haslam, supra note 153 (ordering a forty-five-day freeze). But see Exec. Order 
No. S-2-03 para. 1(b) (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/executive-
order/3381 (ordering a 180-day freeze).  
 374. If the legislation were to work at the federal level, the idea could be copied at the state 
level, perhaps with the assistance of a model state act.  
 375. At least one bill has been proposed in Congress seeking the establishment of soft 
moratoria at the beginning of new presidential terms. See Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (proposing that “a midnight rule shall not take effect until 90 days after the agency 
head is appointed by the new President”). But that bill was written in fairly sweeping terms and, 
if enacted, would have raised many problems. See Beermann, supra note 35, at 354–59 (detailing 
defects in H.R. 34, such as the fact that the proposed bill contemplated a blanket delay on 
midnight rules and did not provide “exceptions for instances in which the incoming 
administration would rather have the midnight rules go into effect”). 
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III.  ISSUES FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Hopefully, the cautionary tale that has just been told about 
regulatory moratoria will start prompting greater dialogue about the 
legality and wisdom of imposing regulatory moratoria and about the 
different contexts in which moratoria have been and should be used. 
Yet it is just a start. Many questions remain unresolved and call out 
for future study. Two such questions are highlighted here. 
First, one significant question in need of future study involves 
looking at what, if any, impact regulatory moratoria—particularly 
hard moratoria lasting at least one year—have had on regulatory 
activity. As noted in Part II, even though politicians repeatedly point 
to the cost savings yielded by regulatory moratoria, scholars know 
very little about the actual impact of regulatory moratoria.376 For 
example, when President Bush implemented the one-year federal 
regulatory moratorium in 1992, did the number of rules produced 
actually go down? When President Bush claimed in 1992 that the 
efforts put into motion by his regulatory moratorium would save 
billions per year,377 was he correct?378 Or were public-interest groups 
correct that his claims were based on “voodoo accounting” and that 
the moratorium was actually costing the country dearly in terms of 
harm to the environment and human health?379 And with regard to 
hard moratoria in states such as Arizona and Washington, has 
regulatory activity decreased? Have cost savings occurred? 
Given the lack of attention that has been paid to regulatory 
moratoria in general, the fact that few researchers have looked at 
these sorts of questions is unsurprising. And the scholars who have 
considered these questions have barely scratched the surface. For 
example, Professor Scott Furlong’s 1995 article, which studies the 
impact of President Bush’s 1992 moratorium from the perspective of 
the number of rules produced, “says nothing about the actual impact 
 
 376. See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.  
 377. Bush, supra note 51, at 664. 
 378. See generally Rosenbaum & Schneider, supra note 46 (quoting a senior Senate staff 
assistant, who said that explaining what the moratorium had done would be “impossible” 
because “[t]he Federal river is awfully wide” and a person “just can’t be sure” when “saying that 
such-and-such happened or didn’t happen because of the moratorium” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 379. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at i, v (calling President Bush’s cost-saving claims 
“voodoo accounting” and arguing that “the regulatory moratorium is costing the nation dearly 
in human life and a damaged environment”).  
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of not promulgating certain regulations.”380 Hence, Professor 
Furlong’s inquiry is limited to looking at rulemaking output, not other 
potential measures of impact. In addition, a 2010 report briefly notes 
Arizona’s experiment with a moratorium and concludes, based on 
surveys completed by agency administrators within the state, that 
even though “some agencies [in Arizona] have utilized the public 
health and safety exception to pass a few rules,”381 other agencies feel 
that “[t]he moratorium has stunted [their] ability . . . to conduct 
rulemakings” in the state.382 Yet the report is limited in that it 
discusses only Arizona’s moratorium and relies only on survey results 
rather than on any kind of empirical analysis to assess the impact of 
Arizona’s moratorium. 
Given that numerous states have experimented with regulatory 
moratoria, researchers should look to the states as laboratories and 
try to analyze the impact of regulatory moratoria. States that have 
implemented hard moratoria, such as Washington, Nevada, and 
Arizona, present researchers with a unique opportunity to study these 
questions through a set of natural experiments. If these regulatory 
moratoria are studied and the results ultimately show that the hard 
moratoria have had little impact on regulatory activity, then hard 
regulatory moratoria could more easily be dismissed as nothing more 
than mere symbolic tools used to curry political favor and to signal 
that a politician is tough on government regulation. 
Another issue crying out for more scholarly attention is the issue 
of state-level regulatory review and reform. In contrast to their 
understanding of regulatory-reform efforts occurring at the federal 
level, scholars know very little about what is going on in the states in 
terms of regulatory review and reform or what themes might be 
emerging in the states.383 Granted, attention is sometimes given to 
 
 380. Furlong, supra note 14, at 257.  
 381. JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH 
REGULATORY REVIEW: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE RULEMAKINGS 
159 (2010), available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experiments_with_
Regulatory_Review.pdf. 
 382. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Casey Cullings, Arizona Department of 
Agriculture). 
 383. Cf. id. at v (“[T]he central theme of this report is that state regulatory review structures 
are powerful, poorly understood, and deserve much more attention than they have received to 
date.”); Rossi, supra note 16, at 553 (“[C]asebooks, treatises, and scholarship harbor a heavy 
bias towards federal administrative law, relegating state administrative procedure little, if any, 
serious attention.”). But see MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 473–75 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing state executive-review programs). 
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regulatory oversight and reform efforts occurring in one isolated state 
or another.384 But what has generally been missing is serious scholarly 
effort to study systematically state-level regulatory-review efforts. 
Much room remains for future scholars to look for emerging trends 
across all the states and to analyze how those patterns do or do not fit 
within themes identified at the federal level.385 
Of course, one major hurdle that stands in the way of remedying 
this lack of attention paid to state-level regulatory reform is the 
relative difficulty of gathering state-level information.386 In writing this 
Article, for example, it became clear that no easily searchable 
electronic database of all state executive orders or directives exists.387 
 
 384. See, e.g., Barbara L. Borden, Legislative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493 (“This comment analyzes Arizona’s existing 
legislative review procedure and a recent proposal for legislative oversight.”); Jonathan Rose, 
Executive Oversight of Rulemaking in Arizona: The Governor’s Regulatory Review Council—
The First Three Years, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425 (“Th[is] article will describe the establishment, 
operation, and effect of the [Governor’s Regulatory Review Council] during its first three 
years . . . .”). 
 385. A few notable exceptions do exist. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 381 (studying regulatory 
review in the fifty states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, in a report spanning 
more than four hundred pages); Brian J. Gerber, Cherie Maestas & Nelson C. Dometrius, State 
Legislative Influence over Agency Rulemaking: The Utility of Ex Ante Review, 5 ST. POL. & 
POL’Y Q. 24 (2005) (studying legislative review of agency rule proposals “[u]sing data from a 
1994 survey of top agency administrators in the 50 states”); Hahn, supra note 16 (studying state 
and federal regulatory reform from a comparative perspective); Patty D. Renfrow & David J. 
Houston, A Comparative Analysis of Rulemaking Provisions in State Administrative Procedure 
Acts, 6 POL’Y STUD. REV. 657 (1987) (comparing provisions of state administrative-procedure 
acts). Nevertheless, these projects studying state-level regulatory review and reform are the 
exception, not the norm. In addition, many of these studies are now dated or rely on old data. 
Even the 2010 report published by Jason Schwartz, supra note 381—which appears to be the 
most comprehensive and the most current study of state-level regulatory review—is already 
dated, see id. at 77 (“[T]his report can only claim reasonable accuracy and comprehensiveness 
through January 2010.”). It does not cover, for example, the numerous regulatory moratoria 
that occurred in the states after early 2010. Indeed, Arizona is the only state with a generalized 
regulatory moratorium discussed in the report. See id. at 159 (“On January 22, 2009, in her first 
official act as governor, Governor Jan Brewer issued a moratorium on all rulemaking 
activities.”).  
 386. See Hahn, supra note 16, at 3 (noting in a report studying state and federal regulatory 
reform that “identification of state regulatory reform provisions was difficult because no 
comprehensive source of data exists” and that compiling state information made it “necessary to 
interview state officials in all states, acquire and analyze available state information, search state 
web pages, and use survey data”); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 381, at ii (noting that in order 
to compile a report on regulatory review in the states, “dozens of researchers at New York 
University School of Law” had to study “the laws and regulations governing agency 
decisionmaking in all 50 states, plus Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico” and also administer and 
collect surveys in the states).  
 387. Westlaw does offer a state executive-order database. It is labeled “Netscan Executive 
Orders” on Westlaw and can be found using “NS-EO” as the database identifier. According to 
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Moving forward, states will need to adopt clearer, more uniform rules 
for dealing with the publication and archiving of state executive 
orders and other materials involving regulatory review. If this shift 
occurs, and if more and more states make such information readily 
available electronically, state-level research should become easier, 
enabling more scholars to conduct comparative state-federal research 
in the regulatory arena in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that when one looks at 
both the federal and the state landscape, one realizes that—far from 
being an isolated or novel concept—regulatory moratoria have 
worked their way into the political toolbox. This Article, however, 
suggests the need for caution toward regulatory moratoria and warns 
that not all moratoria are created equal. Soft moratoria—like those 
used by Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama 
when they entered office and by governors in New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Tennessee, and other states—might appropriately further 
notions of democratic accountability when carefully crafted and used 
for limited periods following a change in administration. 
Hard moratoria, however, which are designed to freeze 
rulemaking for extended periods of time—such as President George 
H.W. Bush’s one-year moratorium in 1992, Washington state’s two-
year suspension of noncritical rulemaking, and Arizona’s multiyear 
rulemaking freeze—are highly problematic. Apart from raising 
questions about whether hard moratoria actually yield cost savings 
and economic benefits, such long-term moratoria also evince an 
antiregulatory bias that bluntly targets all regulation as inherently 
bad. Furthermore, far from leading to a predictable regulatory 
climate, hard moratoria are likely to lead to protracted regulatory 
confusion. In addition, as the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whiley v. Scott demonstrates, executive-driven hard moratoria 
threaten to raise separation-of-powers concerns and other legal 
questions surrounding the executive’s authority to suspend 
rulemaking. Hard moratoria, accordingly, have little to commend 
them other than mere political symbolism. 
 
Westlaw, the database, which is produced from electronic data transmissions provided by 
NETSCAN, does not begin coverage until 2008, and the database proved difficult to use 
effectively.  
